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FOSTERING INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP:
SHARK TANK SHOULDN’T BE THE MODEL
Brian Kingsley Krumm ∗

INTRODUCTION
For the past half century, innovation has driven the economic
growth that has made the American economy the envy of the
world. 1 For most of this period, venture capitalists provided not
only the capital that new innovative companies needed, but also
the management expertise. 2 In the last fifteen years, however, the
venture-capital business has changed. Many venture capitalists
no longer provide money and mentoring to the proverbial inventor working out of her garage. Instead, they primarily focus their
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1. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL (US) COMM. ON COMPARATIVE NAT’L INNOVATION
POLICIES: BEST PRACTICE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, RISING TO THE CHALLENGE: U.S.
INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 201 (Charles W. Wessner & Alan Wm.
Wolff eds., 2012), http://politiques-innovation.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/2012Wessner-STEP-Rising-to-the-Challenge-U.S.-Innovation-Policy-for-Global-Economy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8B5G-3MCP].
2. Charles R. Korsmo, Venture Capital and Preferred Stock, BROOK. L. REV. 1163,
1169 (2013).
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investments on companies that are already established and generating revenue. 3 And even this funding is available only to companies located in a few geographic areas. 4
This pullback could not have happened at a worse time. Interest in entrepreneurship and innovation is at an all-time high.
Nearly a quarter of millennials say they want to be some sort of
entrepreneur. 5 State governments are focusing their economic
development efforts on stimulating entrepreneurism and redirecting resources they formerly spent attempting to recruit industry
from other states. 6 While zeal for entrepreneurialism is growing,
a recent Gallup poll suggests that the number of net U.S. Firms
has steadily decreased since 1977 to the point where there are
more net closures than startups. 7
Given such glaring contradictions, it seems reasonable to
question how best to finance innovation, or rather how to better
coordinate a series of financing opportunities. Not surprisingly,
the federal government has introduced funding programs to fund
new businesses, and several new forms of organizations have developed to assist entrepreneurs in their attempt to commercialize
their innovations. 8 These new organizations have helped, but
much more needs to be done. This article proposes a new kind of
3. FOUNDER EQUITY, THE NEW REALITY OF VENTURE CAPITAL: DISCONNECT
BETWEEN VALUE CREATION AND CAPTURE, http://politiques-innovation.org/ wp-content/
uploads/2013/07/2012-Wessner-STEP-Rising-to-the-Challenge-U.S.-Innovation-Policyfor-Global-Economy.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q3GC-63WG].
4. JOSH LERNER, GEOGRAPHY, VENTURE CAPITAL, AND PUBLIC POLICY 1 (2010),
https://www.hks.harvard.edu /sites /default /files /centers /taubman /files /PB_final_lerner_
vc.pdf [https://perma.cc/7YYC-V6DZ].
5. 24% Of Millennials Plan To Start Their Own Business, But Have The Generation
Called Time On Traditional Family Values?, MINTEL (Nov. 19, 2014),
http://www.mintel.com/press-centre/social-and-lifestyle/enter-the-entrepreneurs-a-quarterof-millennials-plan-to-start-their-own-business-but-have-the-generation-called-time-on-traditional-family-values [https://perma.cc/AWC6-YMDY].
6. ERIN SPARKS, NAT’L GOVERNOR’S ASS’N, TOP TRENDS IN STATE ECON. DEV. 5
(2013), https://www.nga.org /files /live /sites /NGA /files /pdf /2013 /1308 TopTrends inStateEconDevPaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/T2EZ-WJ9Q].
7. Jim Clifton, American Entrepreneurship: Dead or Alive?, GALLUP.COM, (Jan. 13,
2015), http://www.gallup.com/businessjournal /180431/american-entrepreneurship-deadalive.aspx [https://perma.cc/2TSG-N8A2].
8. See, e.g., Meredith Wood, 7 Small Business Grants for Entrepreneurs,
STARTUPNATION (Aug. 9, 2016), https://startupnation.com/start-your-business/small-business-loans/ [https://perma.cc/YBH9-HHXG]; Thomas Smale, 10 Organizations That Provide Support for Entrepreneurs, ENTREPRENEUR (Dec. 2, 2015), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/253283 [https://perma.cc/5CAT-B6D7].
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business organization, one that can serve to fill the gap that venture capital currently does not fill.
Part I of this article provides the reader with a perspective on
how innovation has been financed over the years and how the
roles of the federal government and private equity have evolved
in this process. Parts II and III examine the role that private investment plays in the current innovation finance ecosystem, and
identifies both the inefficiencies and value enhancing attributes of
that source of financing. Part IV describes the major federal policy initiatives implemented in recent years to bolster funding for
start-ups and other small businesses. Part V, which is the heart of
this article, proposes the creation of a business association specifically designed to help entrepreneurs secure the necessary capital
and to assist them in the management of their businesses.

I. HISTORY OF INNOVATION FINANCE
Most economics scholars believe that innovation has been
the main driver of long-term economic growth in the United
States. 9 Beyond macro-economic growth, innovation increases
per capita income and improves standards of living and quality of
life. 10 Because innovation has such a dramatic impact on both
our economy and our social welfare, it is crucial that we look at
how innovation has been financed in the past and how recent
changes in financing practices may limit innovation in the future.

9.
In the most fundamental sense, there are only two ways of increasing the output of the economy: (1) you can increase the number of inputs that go into the
productive process, or (2) if you are clever, you can think of new ways in
which you can get more output from the same number of inputs.
NATHAN ROSENBERG, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., INNOVATION AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH 1 (2004), http://www.oecd.org /cfe /tourism /34267902.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4RUP-D6QK].
10. David Ahlstrom, Innovation and Growth: How Business Contributes to Society,
24 ACAD. OF MGMT. PERSPECTIVES 11, 11-12 (2010). In this article, Ahlstrom challenges
famed economist Milton Freidman’s contention that business’ sole purpose is to generate
profits for shareholders. Id. Instead, he argues that the main goal of business is to develop
new and innovative products that generate growth and deliver important benefits to an increasingly wide range of the world’s population. Id.
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The Patent Act of 1836 11 played a significant role in providing creative individuals with the freedom to innovate and maintain their independence from the firms that bought or licensed
their intellectual property. 12 Inventors at that time were able to
obtain financing primarily from friends, families, and retained
earnings. 13 By the beginning of the twentieth century, however,
the contractual mobility of even the most prolific inventors waned
as they increasingly joined companies as principals or employees. 14 This shift was due in large part by the risks associated with
and rising costs of Research and Development (R&D). 15 The
complexity and capital intensity of new technology made it more
difficult for inventors to obtain sources of outside financing. 16
The firms benefitted not only from owning the intellectual property that was created by the inventors, but also from the reduced
competition from subsequent innovations that would make the
prior practices obsolete. 17
Most of the firms that invested heavily in R&D during this
period were entrepreneurial companies that formed to commercialize the discoveries of their inventors. 18 Forming companies
around prominent inventors was quite popular at this time, and

11. Patent Act of 1836, Ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (July 4, 1836).
12. FINANCING INNOVATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1870 TO THE PRESENT 12 (Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Kenneth L. Sokoloff eds., 2007). Thomas Hughes referred to the late
nineteenth century as the “golden age for independent inventors.” Id.
13. See id. at 14.
14. Id. at 12-13 (citation omitted).
15. Id. at 13.
16. Lamoreaux & Sokoloff, supra note 12, at 13 (citing JOHN W. KENDRICK,
PRODUCTIVITY TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES (1961)).
17. Id. (citing STEVEN W. USSELMAN, REGULATING RAILROAD INNOVATION:
BUSINESS, TECHNOLOGY, AND POLITICS IN AMERICA (2002)). Firm defensive strategies
were greatly assisted by a shift in the judiciary to favor employers regarding patent and trade
secret disputes. Id. at 32 n.17. See also Catherine L. Fisk, Removing the ‘Fuel of Interest’
from the ‘Fire of Genius’: Law and the Employee-Inventor, 1830-1930, 65 U. CHI. L. REV.
1127, 1139 (1998) (“Finally, at the end of the nineteenth century, courts began to see that
employers might hire a person precisely because of his ‘inventive capacities’ and that the
employer might therefore own the product of the employee’s creativity.”).
18. See Lamoreaux & Sokoloff, supra note 12, at 14. “Perhaps the most famous example is General Electric, formed from a merger of two core enterprises that had been organized by investors with the aim of commercializing the inventions of Thomas Edison and
Elihu Thompson.” Id. (citation omitted).
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financing was often informally raised by backers who were personally aquatinted with the inventors. 19 Funding from more formal institutions, such as banks and organized securities markets,
only arose in the later 1920’s. 20 R&D intensive firms like General
Electric, Du Pont, Westinghouse Electric, General Motors, and
IBM all became prominent on the stock exchanges. 21 They relied
on a strategy of developing new technologies in the lab and
achieving returns directly from the innovations through the sale
of their goods and services. 22 Funding for future research was
generated through retained earnings. 23
With the advent of World War II, the federal government
began playing a much greater role in the funding of R&D. 24 Most
of the national R&D budget was funded by government, most of
which came through the Defense Department where the research
was focused predominately on defense technologies. 25 Although
research was by its very nature closely controlled for secrecy, it
had some extraordinary ancillary benefits. 26 A large scale R&D
infrastructure was created in federal laboratories and U.S. universities, which continues to serve as a highly productive source of
innovation. 27 Federal R&D programs created an environment for
interfirm technology diffusion and encouraged the creation of

19. Id.; see also Diego Comin & Ramana Nanda, Financial Development and Technology Diffusion 4 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 15-036, 2014) (“A[s] interest in
these sorts of opportunities grew, technologically creative entrepreneurs increasingly sought
out investors (and vice versa) because the greater technical complexity and capital intensity
of the new technologies meant that effective programs of inventive activity and commercial
exploration required more financial backing than before.”).
20. Lamoreaux & Sokoloff, supra note 12, at 16.
21. Id. at 19; see also HAROLD PASSER, THE ELECTRICAL MANUFACTURERS, 18751900: A STUDY IN COMPETITION, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, TECHNICAL CHANGE, AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH 149-50 (1953); DAVID HOUNSHELL & JOHN KENLY SMITH JR.,
SCIENCE AND CORPORATE STRATEGY: DU PONT R&D (1988); ALFRED SLOAN, MY YEARS
WITH GENERAL MOTORS 216 (John McDonald & Catharine Stevens eds., 1964).
22. See Lamoreaux & Sokoloff, supra note 12 at 19 (citations omitted).
23. See id.
24. Id. at 21-22.
25. See id. at 21. “Through most of the 1953-2005 period, more than 50 percent of
th[e] federal R&D budget was devoted for defense purposes.” Kira R. Fabrizio & David C.
Mowery, The Federal Role in Financing Major Innovations: Information Technology During the Postwar Period, in FINANCING INNOVATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1870 TO THE
PRESENT 283, 283 (Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Kenneth L. Sokoloff eds., 2007).
26. See Lamoreaux & Sokoloff, supra note 12, at 21-22.
27. Fabrizio & Mowery, supra note 25, at 287.
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new companies to support this massive effort. 28 In many instances, expenditures on procurement rather than the R&D programs themselves produced widespread innovations. 29 The nascent information technology (IT) sector (semiconductors,
internet, computer hardware and software) in particular made significant advancements as a result of procurement in support of the
federal R&D programs. 30 These technologies now encompass
many markets and applications beyond national defense and have
further spawned a multitude of civilian-focused innovations. 31
In the mid-1960’s private companies drastically reduced
their spending on R&D. 32 These cutbacks prompted firms to
more closely evaluate their internal expenditures on R&D in an
effort to control costs. 33 Inventors were being required to justify
their research expenditures and financial tests were imposed to
reduce the risk of potential failure. 34 Such management controls
had a negative effect on the innovativeness of the labs. 35 As a
result, many research facilities experienced budget cuts, were
spun off as separate companies, or were shut down entirely. 36
Over the next two decades, a number of small innovative
companies began to emerge that were funded through the expanding private equity market. 37 The larger firms, in turn, focused

28. Id. at 286. Government programs have historically filled the void of investing in
early stage companies that are often too uncertain for the private markets. Id. at 285.
29. Id. at 285.
30. Id. at 287. Federal funding of R&D programs has played a major role in the development of other post-war technologies, such as the pharmaceutical and biomedical sciences, which have benefitted from R&D programs sponsored by the National Institutes of
Health. Fabrizio & Mowery, supra note 25, at 310.
31. Id. “The most obvious examples are the pharmaceuticals and biotechnology industries” which have been spurred on by the National Institutes of Health. Id.
32. See Margaret B.W. Graham, Financing Fiber: Corning’s Invasion of the Telecommunications Market, in FINANCING INNOVATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1870 TO THE
PRESENT 247, 256-57 (Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Kenneth L. Sokoloff eds., 2007).
33. See id. at 257. One of the driving forces for cutting R&D spending was the aforementioned departure between R&D investments and innovation results. Id. at 256; see also
Margaret B.W. Graham, Industrial Research in the Age of Big Science, RESEARCH IN
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION (1985); David A. Hounshell, The Evolution of Industrial Research in the United States, in ENGINES OF INNOVATION: U.S. INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH AT
THE END OF AN ERA 13, 50-51 (Richard S. Rosenbloom & William J. Spencer eds., 1996).
34. See Graham, supra note 32, at 257.
35. See Lamoreaux & Sokoloff, supra note 12, at 20.
36. Id. at 21.
37. Id. at 24.
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their efforts on commercializing and marketing technologies created by such business entities. 38 The early successes by venture
capital firms gave rise to significant growth in the venture capital
industry. 39 An important change in federal policy in 1979 allowed U.S pension funds to invest in venture capital, resulting in
significant growth in the industry. 40 The late 1990’s were a
“boom period” for venture capital as firms benefited from a surge
in interest in the civilian applications for the internet and other
computer technologies. 41 Investments in both venture capital
funds and portfolio companies reached record highs. 42 However,
venture capital financing peaked in early 2000. 43 The stock market crash of 2001 “shook the entire venture capital market as valuations for technology companies collapsed.” 44 Many venture
capital investors reduced their commitments and by 2003 the venture capital investments withered to less than half of their 2001
levels. 45 Since this time, venture capital investments have fluctuated with the economy reaching a low in 2009 and achieving a
post-2000 high level of $59.1 billion in 2015.46
38. Id. at 26.
39. See Paul A. Gompers, The Rise and Fall of Venture Capital, 23 BUS. & ECON.
HIST. 1, 7-10 (1994).
40. See ANDREW METRICK & AYAKO YASUDA, VENTURE CAPITAL AND THE
FINANCE OF INNOVATION 11-12, 19-20 (Lacey Vitetta ed., 2d ed. 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=929145 [https://perma.cc/6LUW-CWYS]. If you are a fiduciary, you are expected to
act like a “prudent man.” This means fiduciaries are to act “with the care, skill, prudence,
and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like
capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like
character and with like aims [.]” 29 USC § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2012). Under the original application, each investment was expected to adhere to risk standards on its own merits, limiting
the ability of investment managers to make any investments deemed potentially risky. Under
the revised 1978 interpretation, the concept of portfolio diversification of risk, measuring
risk at the aggregate portfolio level rather than the investment level to satisfy fiduciary standards would also be accepted.
41. See METRICK & YASUDA, supra note 40, at 13.
42. See NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, 2016 NATIONAL VENTURE CAPITAL
ASSOCIATION YEARBOOK 11 (Thomson Reuters 2016) [hereinafter 2016 YEARBOOK],
www.spurcap.com /nvca- yearbook- 2016.pdf. [https://perma.cc/PGZ7-UZ3N].
43. See id. at 12.
44. Brian Krumm, Understanding the New Tennessee Small Business Investment
Company Credit Act: Stimulating Economic Growth at the Intersection of Free Market
Capitalism and Government Intervention, 11 TRANSACTIONS: THE TENN. J. OF B US. L.
93, 99 (2010).
45. See 2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 42, at 12.
46. See id. at 9. Since 2009, the venture capital activity level has increased for 6
consecutive years. Id. Despite this fact, the $59 billion in investments made in 2015 pales

560

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 70:3

In recent years, there has been a renewed interest in entrepreneurism. While some draw a distinction between entrepreneurism and innovation, the combination of entrepreneurial activity and innovation are considered the major factors behind longterm economic growth. 47 This interest is manifesting itself in
many ways. States are focusing their economic development efforts on supporting entrepreneurism rather than using tax credits
to attract industry from other states and countries. 48 They are investing in state-sponsored venture capital programs 49 and establishing business accelerators and incubators in strategic locations. 50 Colleges and universities across the country are
establishing formal programs and offering degrees in entrepreneurship. 51 They are collaborating on local and regional economic development efforts that focus on innovation. 52 University
researchers are encouraged to commercialize the inventions that
they create through their basic research. 53

in comparison to the $105.9 billion in investments made in 2000. See METRICK & YASUDA,
supra note 40, at 13.
47. See Ahlstrom, supra note 10, at 16.
48. See generally Entrepreneurship’s Role in Economic Development, KAUFFMAN
FOUNDATION: ENTREPRENEURSHIP POLICY DIGEST (June 11, 2014), http://www.kauffman.org/~/ media/ kauffman_org/ resources/ 2014/ entrepreneurship%20policy%20digest/june%202014/entrepreneurship_policy_digest_june_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/DJY3RVAG].
49. See DON GRAVES & CLIFTON G. KELLOGG, Foreword to INFORMATION AND
OBSERVATIONS ON STATE VENTURE CAPITAL PROGRAMS (2013). While the State Small
Business Credit Initiative is one example, the Department of Treasury “manages a large portfolio of programs and fiscal policies intended to strengthen the U.S. Economy . . . .” ERIC
CROMWELL & DAN SCHMISSEUR, INFORMATION AND OBSERVATIONS ON STATE VENTURE
CAPITAL PROGRAMS 1 (2013).
50. See CROMWELL & SCHMISSEUR, supra note 49, at 12; see, e.g., INCITE COINVESTMENT FUND, LAUNCH TENNESSEE, http://launchtn.org/investors/capital/incite/
[https://perma.cc/WB5V-R7A7]. But see STATE VENTURE CAPITAL PROGRAMS, supra note
49, at 1-2 n.1 (describing how 30 states participate in SSBCI and that California and Massachusetts do not use SSBCI capital for state venture capital programs).
51. See OFFICE OF INNOVATION & ENTREPRENEURSHIP ECON. DEV. ADMIN., U.S.
DEP’T OF COMMERCE, THE INNOVATIVE AND ENTREPRENEURIAL UNIVERSITY: HIGHER
EDUCATION, INNOVATION & ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN FOCUS 10 (2013),
https://
www.eda.gov /pdf /The_ Innovative_ and_ Entrepreneurial_University_Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C7X7-FRWS].
52. Id. at 17.
53. The Department of Commerce has established programs to “nurture innovation,
commercialization, and entrepreneurship among students, faculty, alumni, and within their
communities.” Id. at 9.
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In sharp contrast, a recent Gallup article discusses the fact
that since 2008 there have been more net business closures than
start-ups. 54 According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, “the
level of entrepreneurship actually has declined in recent years.” 55
While there can be a wide array of explanations for such an occurrence, the fact remains that since 1977 there has been a significant decline in the number of start-up businesses created in the
U.S. 56 Recent studies suggest that the challenge of obtaining capital is one of the primary contributors inhibiting small business
growth. 57

II. VENTURE CAPITAL
A. History
The modern business entity form of venture capital only
dates back to 1946, when Georges Doriot created American Research and Development Corporation (ARDC) to help fund entrepreneurial firms by those who did not have wealthy friends or
family and could not obtain traditional bank financing. 58 During
its 25-year existence, ARDC generated 15.8% annualized returns
54. Clifton, supra note 7. “[T]he number of self-employed in the U.S. has dropped
notably. Incorporated self-employed fell from 5.78 million in 2008 to 5.13 million in 2011.
It climbed back to 5.64 million in 2016. So, after eight years, the number of incorporated
self-employed remains well short of the 2008 level.” Facts & Data on Small Business and
Entrepreneurship, SMALL BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP COUNCIL, http://sbecouncil.org/aboutus/facts-and-data/ [https://perma.cc/B8UE-6ZL9].
55. Facts & Data on Small Business and Entrepreneurship, supra note 54. Even with
declining entrepreneurship in America, small businesses still comprise up to 97.9% of nationwide firms. Id.
56. See Clifton supra note 7 (containing a graph of U.S. Census Bureau Business Dynamics Statistics displaying a gradual and significant decline from 1977 to the present).
57. See BABSON, THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS IN AMERICA 2016 9 (2016),
http://www.babson.edu/ executive-education/ expanding-entrepreneurship/ 10k-small-business /Documents /goldman-10ksb-report-2016.pdf. [https://perma.cc/3XQD-XZVY]. The
Babson report summarizes insights collected through a survey administered to over 1,800
small business owners across the country, and examines challenges and opportunities facing
established small businesses around four main themes: (1) access to capital; (2) the regulatory environment; (3) workforce; and (4) technology. See id. at 6.
58. METRICK & YASUDA, supra note 40, at 10. Unlike modern venture capital funds
which are typically limited partnerships, ARD was organized as a corporation and was publicly traded. Id. at 10-11. Recorded venture capital activity dates back to 640 B.C., when
Aristotle wrote about Thales, a Phoenician who purchased olive-oil presses in the winter
when they were cheap and gained a considerable return during the more active winter season.
See THE FIRST VENTURE CAPITALISTS: GEORGES DORIOT ON LEADERSHIP, CAPITAL, &
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION, at XIII (Udayan Gupta ed., 2004).
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for its investors, a standard for generating this type of returns that
still exists today. 59 Such a return was heavily dependent on one
primary “home run” investment in Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC). 60 DEC was founded by two MIT engineers who
“wanted to make computers smaller, cheaper and easier to use.” 61
In return for ARDC’s $70,000 investment and Doriot’s strategic
guidance, ARDC received 70% of the stock in DEC. 62 Fearing
that DEC would fall into hostile hands when he retired, he arranged for a buyout in 1972, where DEC shares were passed on
to the ARDC investors.63 ARDC sold its holdings to a much
larger corporation with ARDC’s interest in DEC shares valued at
$450 million.64
During his tenure with ARDC, Doriot funded over a hundred
different technology based start-ups in a wide range of industries
from healthcare to telecommunications. He and his associates
would use their academic credentials to scour labs for austronautical and military funded government research which had potential for civilian-commercial applications. 65 Doriot relied heavily
on the character of the entrepreneur when deciding on what companies to invest in. 66 He stuck with these companies for the longterm, and believed that “profit was a byproduct of hard work and
commitment, but not the endpoint.” 67 Indeed, much of his success as a Harvard Business School professor and as a venture capitalist is attributed to his personal involvement with his students’
and individuals whose companies he invested in. 68
59. METRICK & YASUDA, supra note 40, at 10.
60. Id. “Excluding the $70,000 investment in their biggest ‘home run’, the Digital
Equipment Corporation, ARD[C]’s 25-year annualized performance drops to 7.4 percent.”
Id.
61. Andrew Beattie, Georges Doriot and The Birth of Venture Capital, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://investopedia.com/articles/financialcareers/10/georges-doriot-venture-capital.asp
[perma.cc/SG5E-MKC8].
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. Doriot later regretted the decision to sell to a larger corporation. Id. He felt
that the larger corporate culture and impersonal management hampered DEC’s flexibility.
Id.
65. Beattie, supra note 61.
66. See id.
67. Id. As a Harvard Business School professor, Doriot prided himself on instilling in
his students the value of an “honest day’s work.” SPENCER E. ANTE, CREATIVE CAPITAL:
GEORGES DORIOT AND THE BIRTH OF VENTURE CAPITAL 43, 47 (2008).
68. Gupta, supra note 58, at XIV, XIX.

2017

FOSTERING INNOVATION

563

ARDC’s success spurred others to create venture funds and
“enter the venture capital field using Doriot’s model.” 69 Many of
these new venture capital firms were started by former students
and ARDC employees. 70 Doriot supported these efforts and believed that “as long as [start-ups] were subjected to selective rigor
and . . . properly supported [,]” the more new ventures the better. 71 Doriot began to see the standards of some venture capital
firms drop as they focused on realizing “quick profit from [initial
public offerings] rather than building a company.” 72 In a 1971
letter to ARDC shareholders, Doriot wrote “[v]enture capital
seems to have shifted from a constructive, difficult task to a new
method of speculation.” 73
Recognizing the need for additional capital for small startups beyond what the private equity market was providing, Congress passed the Small Business Act of 1958. 74 This act created
the Small Business Administration (SBA) and subsequently the
Small Business Development Companies (SBICs). 75 SBICs are
privately owned investment companies that are licensed and regulated by the Small Business Administration to provide venture
capital to small independent businesses. 76 SBICs have various
investment philosophies, most provide long-term loans to qualified small businesses, but some more aggressive firms make equity-participation loans. 77 There are currently over 290 licensed
69. Beattie, supra note 61.
70. Id. Because of the public status of ARDC, Doriot was unable to compensate his
employees with options on those start-up companies that they were building. See ANTE,
supra note 67, at 65.
71. Beattie, supra note 61.
72. Id.
73. Gupta, supra note 58, at 51.
74. Small Business Act, Pub. L. No. 85-536 67 Stat. 232 (1958); METRICK & YASUDA,
supra note 40, at 10-11.
75. METRICK & YASUDA, supra note 40, at 11.
76. U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, https://www.sba.gov /offices /headquarters /ooi /resources /4905 [https://perma.cc/L3VM-NXDR]. “Only companies defined
by SBA as ‘small’ are eligible for SBIC financing.” Id. “Generally, the SBIC Program
defines a company as ‘small’ when its net worth is $18.0 million or less and its average after
tax net income for the prior two years does not exceed $6.0 million.” Id.
77. Small Business Investment Companies (SBIC), INC., https://www.inc.com/encyclopedia/small-business-investment-companies-sbic.html [https://perma.cc/B7GU-KGNU].
“SBICs . . . [can] range from limited partnerships to subsidiaries of multinational corporations.” Id. “For banks, establishment of an SBIC subsidiary is often an attractive proposition, because it enables them to make small business investments that would otherwise be
closed to them because of U.S. banking laws and requirements.” Id. Regardless of their
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SBICs in existence across the country today. 78 While SBICs did
not immediately contribute a significant source of venture capital
for start-ups, they eventually provided a valuable training ground
for venture capitalists. 79
In the early 1960’s venture capital firms began organizing as
limited partnerships. 80 Venture capitalists served as general partners and passive investors, while institutions such as pension
funds, university endowments, and other entities served as the primary investors and limited partners. 81 The limited partnership
business-entity form offered two distinct advantages over the venture capital corporation. It allowed the venture fund to take advantage of the pass through taxation feature of the partnership,
while providing the limited partners with the liability protection
offered to corporations. 82 Additionally, it allowed the general
partners to craft a limited partnership agreement which vests them
with substantial discretion to function in multiple roles within the
company such as an officer, an advisor, and a source of funding
while limiting their own personal liability to the fullest extent possible. 83 The transformation to the limited partnership structure is
business structure, “their ultimate goal is to realize a profit from their various business transactions.” Id. Once SBA approved, SBICs can leverage funds at advantageous rates from the
United States Treasury based upon the amount of private investment in the fund. Id. “Some
SBICs make most of their revenue from straight debt financing, with their profit coming
from the differential between the cost of borrowing from the SBA and the interest rate they
charge the small business [borrower]” and some make equity-participation loans. Id. Typically, SBICs are eligible to receive up to 300% of private equity raised. 13 C.F.R. §
107.1150(a) (2017).
78. U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, SBIC ANNUAL REPORT FY 1 (2014),
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/SBICAnnualReport_FY2014_Final_508.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/J24S-BDLB]. “In FY 2014, SBA licensed 30 SBICs with over $1.3 billion
in private investor capital . . . bringing the SBIC operating portfolio to 294 funds with $11.8
billion in Private Capital and almost $10.7 billion in SBA outstanding leverage and commitments for a total of $22.5 billion of capital under management.” Id. at 2-3.
79. See METRICK & YASUDA, supra note 40, at 11, 15. “Since 1958, SBICs have
invested almost $60 billion in small U.S. companies . . . .” The Steps to SBIC Financing,
SMALL BUSINESS INVESTOR ALLIANCE, http://www.sbia.org /?page=sbic_financing
[https://perma.cc/ZN42-LVWH].
80. METRICK & YASUDA, supra note 40 at 11; see also Martin Kenney & Richard
Florida, Venture Capital in Silicon Valley: Fueling New Firm Formation, in
UNDERSTANDING SILICON VALLEY: THE ANATOMY OF AN ENTREPRENEURIAL REGION 98,
109 (Martin Kenney ed., 2000).
81. David Rosenberg, Venture Capital Limited Partnerships: A Study in Freedom of
Contract, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 363, 366, 375 (2002).
82. Id. at 376.
83. See id. at 382.
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viewed as one of “the . . . most important organizational innovation[s] of the modern venture capital system.” 84
Perhaps the most significant policy change that impacted
venture-capital investment occurred in 1979 when U.S. pension
fund rules were relaxed to allow pension funds to invest in this
asset class. 85 With vast amounts of money to invest compared to
the individual investor, pension funds soon began to dominate the
venture capital market; 86 in fact, pension funds presently “supply
nearly half of all the money for [venture capital] in the United
States.” 87 Following a surge in venture capital investment after
the relaxation of ERISA laws, growth in the venture capital industry “remained [relatively] stable throughout the 1980s.”88
This growth continued through the first half of the 1990s, increasing from $3 billion in 1983 to just over $4 billion in 1994. 89
In the late 1990s, the United States market experienced extraordinary growth in internet and computer technology investments, and venture capitalists were there to share in the profit.90
Venture capital investments in such companies were yielding
spectacular returns, and institutional investors rushed in to participate. 91 Venture capital investments grew from a previous high
of around $4 billion in the early 90s to an unprecedented level of
$104 billion in 2000. 92 This boom in venture capital investments,
however, was short lived. “The [stock market] crash and technology slump that started in March 2000 shook virtually the entire
venture capital industry as valuations for startup technology companies collapsed.” 93 Venture capital investments fell by nearly
half from the fourth quarter of 2000 to the first quarter of 2001. 94
84. Id. at 365 (citation omitted).
85. METRICK & YASUDA, supra note 40, at 11.
86. Id. at 11-12.
87. Id. at 11.
88. Id. at 12.
89. Id.
90. See METRICK & YASUDA, supra note 40, at 12.
91. See id. Investments rose to $11.0 billion in 1996, $14.7 billion in 1997, $20.9
billion in 1998, and $54.4 billion in 1999 before reaching an all-time high of $105.9 billion
in 2000. Id. at 12-13.
92. Id. at 12.
93. M Maritha, et al., Role of Venture Capital in Indian Economy, 4 IOSR J. of BUS.
& MGMT., Sept.-Oct. 2012, at 46, 51.
94. See id. “Although the post-boom years represent just a small fraction of the peak
levels of venture investment reached in 2000, they still represent an increase over the levels
of investment from 1980 through 1995.” Id. at 51. “[V]enture investment was 0.058% [of

566

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 70:3

During the post-boom period venture capital investments fluctuated between $20 and $30 billion dollars a year 95 until 2009 where
activity steadily increased before reaching $58.8 billion in 2015.96

B. The Limited Availability of Venture Capital
The National Venture Capital Association recognizes 718
venture capital firms in existence in 2015 with a total of over $165
billion of capital under management. 97 There were 3,709 companies funded in 2015, and 1,444 of those raised money for the first
time. 98 During this period, companies in 46 states received venture capital funding; however, 41% of the deals and 57% of the
total funds invested were in California. 99 Companies in California, New York, and Massachusetts were the beneficiaries of 78%
of all such investments. 100
“An obstacle for supporting high-growth small businesses as
a state economic development strategy is the supply of private
sector equity investors, both in terms of the number of experienced venture investors and the amount of capital available for
venture investments.” 101 As the above data indicates, “the supply
and accessibility of privately managed venture capital is far more
limited for small businesses located outside a small number of

GDP] in 1994, peaked at 1.087% (nearly 19 times the 1994 level) in 2000 and ranged from
0.164% to 0.182% in 2003 and 2004.” Id. “The revival of an Internet-driven environment
in 2004 through 2007 helped to revive the venture-capital environment.” Id. “However, as
a percentage of the overall private equity market, venture capital has still not reached its mid1990s level, let alone its peak in 2000.” Id.
95. METRICK & YASUDA, supra note 40, at 13. The years following 2000 are referred
to as the post-boom period for venture capital. Id.
96. See 2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 42, at 10-11.
97. Id. at 9.
98. Id. at 9, 12. Of the 3,709 companies funded, 2,620 were in information technology,
664 were in Medical/Health/Life Sciences and 425 were Non-High Technology industry
groups. Id. at 12.
99. Id. at 9.
100. See id. at 14.
101. PROGRAM EVALUATION OF THE US DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY STATE SMALL
BUSINESS CREDIT INITIATIVE, U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY 61 (2016) [hereinafter
EVALUATION OF SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT INITIATIVE], https://www.treasury.gov/ resource-center/ sb-programs/ Documents/ SSBCI%20 Program%20 Evaluation%20
2016%20 -%20 Full%20 Report.pdf. [https://perma.cc/2BHA-2K2N].

2017

FOSTERING INNOVATION

567

geographic regions.” 102 Given that most venture capitalists become actively engaged with their portfolio companies, 103 it is critical that the company is within reasonable commuting distance
from the fund. 104 As a result, the funded companies are often required to move closer to the funding source. 105 Start-ups emanating from universities, government operations, and corporations
outside these three states are developing valuable intellectual
property, and entrepreneurs are seeking seed capital with which
to commercialize such innovations. 106 Economic development
officials outside of traditional venture capital centers view such
agglomeration of venture capital funding as a constraint on innovation, stifling to such start-ups, as well as state economic development efforts designed to foster the growth in state entrepreneurial activities. 107
Within this macroeconomic context, an entrepreneur must
also understand that “[f]or every 100 business plans that come to
a venture capital firm for funding . . . only 10 or so get a serious

102. Id.
103. They usually accomplish this by taking a board seat and acting as strategic advisors. 2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 42, at 6.
104. See Scott Shane, Why Venture Capital Deals Stay in Silicon Valley,
ENTREPRENEUR.COM (Nov. 2, 2015), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/252225
[https://perma.cc/Q44A-A767]. “For example, since 2010, small businesses receiving 80
percent of the $166 billion of venture capital investments were headquartered in fewer than
1 percent of the U.S. counties.” EVALUATION OF SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT INITIATIVE, supra note 101, at 61 (citation omitted).
105. See Shane, supra note 104. Observers of equity capital markets have noted that
the “virtuous cycle” of venture-backed businesses located close to funding sources has also
created a “vicious cycle” for regions with few venture capital firms actively investing in local
businesses. LERNER, supra note 4, at 6.
106. See generally 2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 42 (containing numerous graphic data
displays). According to the State Science and Technology Institute (SSTI), three of the primary elements of an innovation or technology-based economy include intellectual infrastructure, an entrepreneurial culture, and investment capital. See A RESOURCE GUIDE FOR
TECHNOLOGY-BASED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: POSITIONING UNIVERSITIES AS DRIVERS
FOSTERING ENTREPRENEURSHIP INCREASING ACCESS TO CAPITAL, STATE SCIENCE &
TECHNOLOGY INSTITUTE 7 (2006) [hereinafter RESOURCE GUIDE], http://ssti.org/sites/default/files/resourceguidefortbed.pdf. [https://perma.cc/5T3C-8WTH].
107. See RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 106, at 7, 13. Research has shown that young,
high-growth businesses contribute disproportionately to job growth and positive spillover
effects for regional economies. See Haltiwanger et al., Who Creates Jobs? Small vs. Large
vs. Young 9-10 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 16300, 2010),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w16300.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ZVD-UFS8].
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look, and only one ends up being funded.” 108 “The venture capital firm looks at the “management team, the concept, the marketplace, fit to the fund’s objectives, the value-added potential for
the firm, and the capital needed to build a successful business.”109
The reality is that most start-ups do not qualify for venture capital
and likely never will. Most venture capitalists invest only in fastgrowing ventures that have a proven record of accomplishment.
This reduces the risk of poor fund performance. 110 The ultimate
objective of venture capital funds is to invest in start-up companies and obtain a high rate of return in the shortest time frame
possible. 111 This is typically accomplished through merger and
acquisition or through an initial public offering in the security
markets. 112
Given this focus on speedy monetization, there are a number
of reasons why entrepreneurs may not choose to access venture
capital. Many first-time entrepreneurs can be confused over who
the real customer is in a venture capital transaction. 113 Under the
typical venture capital model the investors are limited partners
who supply 99% of the fund’s capital. 114 The general partners
supply 1% of the capital and receive an annual management fee
of 2% of the value of the fund. 115 The general partners decide
which start-ups to invest in and when such investments should be
liquidated. The most common profit-sharing arrangement is an
108. 2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 42, at 6.
109. Id. at 6-7.
110. Growth stage companies received the highest percentage of investment in 2015.
2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 42, at 26.
111. METRICK & YASUDA, supra note 40, at 3. The typical fund is set up for a tenyear life. Id. at 16. “Historically, after the [tenth] year, only a few companies that typically
do not have huge upside potential remain in the portfolios.” Id. at 20. “But the slow pace of
exits in recent years has resulted in a number of good, mature companies remaining in portfolios well past the nominal 10-year mark.” Id. “Life science funds tend to have lives two
years longer than typical technology funds.” Id. The median initial public offering of a fund
in this analysis is 14.17 years. Id.
112. 2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 42, at 6. I will refer to investors in venture capital
funds as investors. While the venture capitalists running those funds are also investors in the
start-up firms, I will refer to them simply as venture capitalists. The term entrepreneurs and
founders are used interchangeably. The innovation-intensive start-ups being financed will
be referred to as start-ups or portfolio companies, or simply, the venture.
113. See id. at 7.
114. Diane Mulcahy, Venture Capitalists Get Paid Well to Lose Money, HARV. BUS.
REV., Aug. 5, 2014, https://hbr.org/2014/08/venture-capitalists-get-paid-well-to-lose-money
[https://perma.cc/3PVP-6ZFY].
115. See id.
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80/20 split, where after returning all the original investment to the
limited partners, the general partner keeps 20% of the fund’s
profit and distributes 80% to the limited partners. 116 This compensation structure, known as Carried Interest, is taxed at the reduced rate applicable to the capital gain rate and is the incentive
that makes private equity so enticing for investment professionals. 117
Once this model is understood, it becomes clear that the venture-capital-funds customers are the general partner(s) and investors, and the entrepreneur and the start-up company is the product
that is partially acquired, nurtured, and ultimately sold for a profit.
The typical venture investee will be a company that has large
growth potential over a short period of time. Only about “three
percent of all businesses can be classified as high growth businesses” that venture capitalists typically target. 118 Within the subset of high-growth businesses, venture companies largely target
established or rapidly growing companies rather than early-stage
or seed companies. 119 In fact, most venture capital funding “is
going to large, late-stage companies including ‘unicorns,’ which
are private companies valued at $1 billion or more.” 120 Those
“unicorns” accounted for most of the available VC funding in
early 2016, comprising $40 billion in the first half of 2016 out of
the $79 billion total invested. 121

C. The Conflicts of Interest Inherent in Venture
Capital

116. See id.
117. See Todd Hixon, An Insider Perspective On Carried Interest, FORBES (Feb. 2,
2012, 1:50 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/toddhixon/2012/02/02/an-insider-perspectiveon-carried-interest/#5f4a49b56b0a [https://perma.cc/4D8B-A5HU].
118. Karen Mills, The 4 Types of Small Businesses, and Why Each One Matters,
HARV. BUS. REV., Aug. 30, 2015, https://hbr.org/2015/04/the-4-types-of-small-businessesand-why-each-one-matters [https://perma.cc/NDJ5-XKV7].
119. Lizette Chapman, Unicorns Snag Most Venture Capital in First Half of 2016,
BLOOMBERG (July 8, 2016, 7:16 p.m.), https://www.bloomberg.com /news /articles /201607-07 /unicorns- snag- most- venture- capital- in- first- half- of -2016
[https://perma.cc/3XM8-KGWE].
120. Id.
121. Id.
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Once the fund is raised, the venture capitalist begins the process of acquiring an interest in an attractive start-up. Many firsttime entrepreneurs dream of the day that they hit it big and get a
venture capital firm to back their new start-up. After all, that is
how the likes of Apple, Microsoft, Google, and Starbucks got
their start. 122 However, most novice entrepreneurs are unaware
of the dynamics of entering into a contractual relationship with a
venture capital firm and are blind to the potential consequences. 123 There are inherent conflicts of interest between the
entrepreneur and the venture capital firm. The most obvious is
the one that everyone knows from Shark Tank. The entrepreneur
wants to get the most money from the investor while giving up
the smallest share of the company; the investor wants the opposite. The venture capitalist has an advantage here, because the
venture capitalist has wide experience in valuing companies and
a staff of analysts to help with the job.
Often, venture capital contracts can have problems embedded at their inception. During the negotiations stage, the relative
imbalance of bargaining power can influence the valuation of the
start-up company and the contractual rights of the parties.124
“Venture capital contracts are [largely] non-negotiable” 125 and
the terms are favorably drafted to protect the interests of the fund
and provide the venture capitalist with as much control as possible
over the portfolio company. 126 In addition, if there are no other
sources of financing, the start-up has little leverage in negotiating
the amount of equity it must give up to the venture capitalist for
the necessary financing.
While it may appear that such contracts are patently unfair
to the entrepreneur, one must consider the amount of risk that the
122. See 2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 42 at 7.
123. Andy Heughebaert & Sophie Manigart, Firm Valuation in Venture Capital Financing Rounds: The Role of Investor Bargaining Power, 39 J. BUS. FIN. & ACC. 500, 50506 (2012) (citations omitted), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1729773
[https://perma.cc/8GAH-H4JW]; see also Yrjö Koskinen, et. al., Private Information and
Bargaining Power in Venture Capital Financing, 3 (2013), https://ssrn.com/abstract=891192
[https://perma.cc/3PY7-LR9J].
124. Heughebaert & Manigart, supra note 123; see also Yrjö Koskinen, et. al., supra
note 123.
125. See Manuel A. Utset, Reciprocal Fairness, Strategic Behavior & Venture Survival: A Theory of Venture Capital-Financed Firms, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 45, 55 n.16 (2002).
126. Id. at 61 (stating that venture capitalist are permitted to “keep a ‘tight leash’ on
entrepreneurs”).
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investors are taking in such speculative investments, and the fiduciary duties the general partners of the venture capital firm owe
their limited partners when they make these investments 127 Failure rates for start-ups are between 30 and 95% depending on how
failure is defined. 128 The agreements are designed to give the
general partners the most flexibility possible to navigate between
what is in the best interest of the fund versus what is in the best
interest of the portfolio company. However, as a practical matter,
the way the venture capital compensation structures are set up, the
incentives clearly favor the interests of the fund. 129
The general partners or their agents will typically take seats
on the board of the portfolio companies to ensure oversight over
the start-up. 130 Operational conflicts often arise from information-asymmetry problems, where both the entrepreneur and the
venture capitalist are in possession of specialized information
which was not uncovered during due diligence or contemplated
in the agreement. 131 Furthermore, the founders and venture capitalist will often have differing expectations and interests in the
transaction and conflicts arise from these divergences. 132
127. See Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the
American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1076 (2003) (“The special character of venture capital contracting is shaped by the fact that investing in early stage, high technology
companies presents [uncertainty, information asymmetry, and opportunism] in an extreme
form.”); George G. Triantis, Financial Contract Design in the World of Venture Capital, 68
U. CHI. L. REV. 305, 311-12 (2001) (observing that financial contracting is more difficult in
venture capital than in bank lending).
128. See Carmen Nobel, Why Companies Fail—and How Their Founder Can Bounce
Back, HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL (Mar. 7, 2011), http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/why-companies-failand-how-their-founders-can-bounce-back [https://perma.cc/UGX3-65NU]. Shikhar
Ghosh, a senior lecturer at Harvard Business School, estimates that if failure means liquidating all assets, with investors losing all or most of their investment, then the failure rate for
start-ups is 30 to 40%. If failure is defined as failing to meet projected return on investment,
the failure rate is between 70 and 80%. If failure is defined as failing to meet a previously
declared projection, then the failure rate is between 90 and 95%. Id.
129. See Heughebaert & Manigart, supra note 123, at 506.
130. See Utset, supra note 125, at 61.
131. See Zsuzsanna Fluck, et. al., Venture Capital Contracting and Syndication: An
Experiment in Computational Corporate Finance, 20 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 11624, 2005) (citation omitted), http://www.nber.org/papers/w11624
[https://perma.cc/6DWW-GCL3]. Information asymmetry plays a crucial role in the venture
industry because the founder will often possess much greater knowledge of the product or
products while the venture investor possesses business acumen and market knowledge. See
Maya Steinitz, The Litigation Finance Contract, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 455, 488 (2012).
132. See JUAN LI & JAN TONY ABRAHAMSSON, NEW MONEY, NEW PROBLEMS: A
QUALITATIVE

STUDY

OF THE

CONFLICTS
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VENTURE
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Because of the potential conflicts that arise during the maturation process, the parties in the venture transaction sometimes
resort to obstructionist measures to further their individual goals
at the expense of the company or the venture itself. 133 For example, the general partners will structure the investment in the portfolio company by taking preferred shares “with significant liquidation preferences and redemption rights, [which] ‘puts them in a
superior position to common stockholders’—i.e. the founder in
liquidation or acquisition.” 134 One of the ways that venture capitalist can usurp company control from the founders is through
wash-out financing. 135 When venture capitalist undergo a round
of wash-out financing, the new issuance drastically dilutes the
ownership of the founders and the venture capitalists are able to
take control of the company. 136
Once the venture capitalist has obtained majority control, the
venture capitalist may continue nurturing the company until it can
be brought to market, but they may also “dissolve the company
and salvage what it can,”—meaning selling the portfolio-company’s assets in an effort to break even. 137 If the venture capitalist
ENTREPRENEURS IN SWEDEN 23 (2011) (noting a Swedish market study where conflicts most
often arise out of differing expectations and objectives), http://www.diva-portal.org /smash
/get/diva2:426612/FULLTEXT01 [https://perma.cc/VAZ3-NKES].
133. See Utset, supra note 125, at 117 n.236. Utset believes that the relative dependence on the entrepreneur’s remaining in the venture can cause the entrepreneur to take company-harming actions due to the often VC-favorable contract provisions. Id.
134. Vladimir Atanasov, et. al., The Impact of Litigation on Venture Capitalist Reputation, 6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Paper No. 13641, 2007) http://www.nber.org/papers/w13641 [https://perma.cc/3JXJ-QSAX]; see José M. Padilla, What’s Wrong with a
Washout?: Fiduciary Duties of the Venture Capitalist Investor in a Washout Financing, 1
HOUS. BUS. & TAX L. J. 269, 274 (2001); see also Utset, supra note 125, at 51 (“[V]enture
capitalists structure transactions so as to retain control. Among other things, control gives
venture capitalists the ability to freely maneuver during the venture, including the ability to
dismiss entrepreneurs when their services are no longer deemed valuable . . . .”).
135. Padilla, supra note 134, at 276. Practically speaking, however, washouts are
“excruciating” and “ugly.” Paul Jones, Startup Finance: A VC’s Thoughts on Wash Out
Rounds, TECHNORI (Apr. 12, 2013), http://www.technori.com /2013/04/4114-startup-finance-a-vcs-thoughts-on-wash-out-rounds/ [https://perma.cc/8ZMW-BEKJ].
136. See John R. LeClaire, et. al., WatchMark Ruling Clarifies Pay-To-Play,
VENTURE CAPITAL JOURNAL 64 (Mar. 2005).
137. Utset, supra note 125, at 57, 65 (“Intangible assets like intellectual property are
harder to value and sell to third parties.”); see also Ralph Bachmann & Ibolya Schindele,
Theft and Syndication in Venture Capital Finance 1, 3 (2006), https://ssrn.com/abstract=896025 [https://perma.cc/3TPE-TGPW] (stating that “[v]enture capitalists hold portfolios of projects, which provides them with the opportunities and the incentives to apply
ideas or technologies developed by one entrepreneur in other projects.”).
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takes the latter course, they salvage some or all of their initial investment, but in doing so they take away any chance for the portfolio company to succeed, thereby assuring that the founders will
get nothing for all the time, money, and hard work they put into
the business.
In many ventures, the primary asset of the portfolio company
is its intellectual property, which the venture investor can either
sell to third parties or incorporate into its other portfolio companies which are being financed through the fund. 138 Because
founders typically only contribute human capital and intellectual
property to the venture, 139 much of their continued managerial involvement depends on future product developments. The tacit
knowledge of the intellectual property possessed by the founders
can play an important role in how successful the products are or
how services perform in the marketplace. 140 Withholding such
information is the only real obstructionist behavior that the entrepreneur can undertake to retaliate against the opportunistic behavior of the venture capitalist. Due to the contractual protections
contained in the venture capital agreement, the founder is limited
in its self-serving actions. 141
The only real alternative that an aggrieved entrepreneur has
is to take legal action. However, an entrepreneur that is seeking
outside funding to promote their start-up, will likely not have the
financial ability to support litigation. Again, because the venture
capital agreements are largely drafted to protect the interests of
the venture capitalist, pursuing such an option is rarely beneficial.
An example of how such investor-favorable provisions play out
in an action of this nature is reflected in the Delaware case In re
Trados Inc. Shareholder Litigation; here, a founder unsuccessfully attempted to sue based on an investor’s supposed breach of
fiduciary duty by utilizing their liquidation preference. 142 Courts
138. See Utset, supra note 125, at 57.
139. See id.
140. Brian K. Krumm, University Technology Transfer - Profit Centers or Black
Holes: Moving Toward a More Productive University Innovation Ecosystem Policy, 14 NW.
J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 171, 191 (2016).
141. Utset, supra note 125, at 57. Utset describes how entrepreneurs facing dismissal
or liquidation may engage in “hold-up” behavior to cease development of the product. Id.
A study of VC-involved litigation showed that founder claims usually center around fraud
and 94% of trials end in victory for the VC. See Atanasov et al., supra note 134, at 21.
142. 73 A.3d 17, 20, 33-34 (Del. Ch. 2013). While Trados is one example of VC
litigation, there are several others. See generally Encite LLC v. Soni, No. 2476-VCG, 2011
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will generally give effect to the terms of the venture agreement
because the contracts reflect the exchange of the venture capitalist’s added value for such control provisions. 143 In reality, the
best protection an entrepreneur has in this process is evaluating
the venture capitalist’s reputation prior to entering into such
agreements. 144 The industry tends to monitor itself and those venture capital firms that have a history of opportunistic or predatory
actions toward their portfolio companies can be uncovered during
the due diligence process. 145
While such disputes may prove the exception rather than the
rule, the relationship proves to be most successful when all of the
parties’ interests are aligned. 146 When working effectively, the
venture capital model has produced unprecedented results in
bringing innovative products and services to market. 147 Such
market successes are only partially attributable to the capital contributions made to the venture, and perhaps to an even greater extent it is the value added services that the venture firms provide
that make the difference. 148 “Although [such activities are] an
important part of the bargain between the venture capitalists and
the entrepreneur, they are rarely specified” in venture capital contracts. 149

WL 5920896 (Del. Ch. Nov. 28, 2011) (describing governance disputes arising in the course
of a venture); see, e.g., In re Nine Sys. Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 3940-VCN, 2014 WL
4383127, at *34 (Del. Ch. Sept. 4, 2014) (describing the litigation challenges with “fair dealing and fair price” issues); Orban v. Field, No. 12820, 1997 WL 153831, at *1 (Del. Ch.
Apr. 1, 1997) (the court found no breach of good faith when common stock holders received
no consideration in a merger); Casanaro v. Bloodhound Techsm Inc., 65 A.3d 618, 637 (Del.
Ch. 2013) (describing the application of the business judgment rule in obtaining control of
the company).
143. See David Rosenberg, Venture Capital Limited Partnerships: A Study in Freedom of Contract, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 363, 367-68 (2002).
144. See Atanasov, et. al., supra note 134, at 2, 4.
145. Id. at 4.
146. See 2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 42, at 7-8.
147. Id. at 6.
148. See TERTTU LUUKKONEN, ET. AL, IMPORTANCE OF THE NON-FINANCIAL VALUE
ADDED OF GOVERNMENT AND INDEPENDENT VENTURE CAPITALISTS 3
(KESKUSTELUAIHEITA DISCUSSION PAPERS, 2011), https://www.etla.fi/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/dp1257.pdf [https://perma.cc/R7P8-2C2H].
149. D. Gordon Smith, Venture Capital Contracting in the Information Age, 2 J.
SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 133, 134 (1998).
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D. Venture Capital’s Value Enhancing Activities
When entrepreneurs enter into business with active investors
they receive a boost in capital from the firm to evolve into the
next step in its life cycle. More importantly, however, they receive non-monetary assistance from the active investor. Venture
capitalists provide much more than money to the venture, they
nurture the enterprise in hopes of increasing the value of its holdings. 150 The venture capitalist can serve as a networking tool, introduce the founders to new areas of the venture industry, proffer
financial alternatives, legitimize the firm, and coach the firm to
success.
While the organizational structure of venture capital firms
take on many different forms, in many respects they resemble a
consulting firm. The senior personnel in the hierarchy are the
general partners or managing directors. They make the final investment decisions and sit on the board of directors of the portfolio companies. 151 Principals or directors are generally next in
line, followed by associates and analysts who perform a range of
duties that include performing due diligence, monitoring existing
investments, and evaluating prospective investments. 152 Some
firms have venture partners or operating partners, entrepreneurs
who have a part time relationship with the firm. In some firms,
operating partners take an active role in managing the investment
in the portfolio company as chairman or director. 153 Some firms
have entrepreneurs in residence who work with the firm while
looking for their next entrepreneurial venture and assist the firm
with due diligence, introductions, and networking during the residence. 154
The venture capitalist’s role in the transaction is to “provide
advice, guidance and even supervision to the firms in their portfolios.” 155 This financial, administrative, marketing, strategy,
150. Rosenburg, supra note 143, at 364.
151. JEFFREY BUSSGANG, MASTERING THE VC GAME 50 (2011).
152. Id. at 50-51; BRAD FELD & JASON MENDELSON, VENTURE DEALS: BE SMARTER
THAN YOUR LAWYER AND VENTURE CAPITALIST 7 (2d ed. 2013).
153. FELD & MENDELSON, supra note 152, at 7.
154. Id. at 7-8; BUSSGANG, supra note 151, at 53-54; ANDREW ROMAS, THE
ENTREPRENEURIAL BIBLE TO VENTURE CAPITAL: INSIDE SECRETS FROM THE LEADERS OF
THE STARTUP GAME 67 (2013).
155. Rosenburg, supra note 143 at 364.
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and management support – or “coaching” – is usually lacking in
“young innovative firms operating in high-tech industries.”156
Scholars note that the active nature of venture capitalist involvement gives investees competitive advantage over passive-investor
firms. 157 And it is common for venture funds to communicate
daily with their startups to grow and build the company. 158 Eventually, the venture capitalist will help mold the company’s business model and help recruit talent to work towards high-yield exit
strategies. 159
While venture capitalists offer the entrepreneur technical
and commercial advice, they also expand the entrepreneur’s network. 160 Venture capital networks “facilitate the sharing of information, contacts, and resources” among other venture capital
firms and can “improve the chances of securing follow-on VC
funding for portfolio companies, and may indirectly provide access to other VC’s relationships with service providers . . . .”161
In fact, a “VC’s network centrality has a positive and significant
effect on the probability that a portfolio company survives to a
subsequent funding round or exits successfully.” 162 Further,
firms may specialize in specific markets and can provide otherwise unavailable insight to the investee company. 163
Venture capital firms also provide unapparent value to the
transaction by legitimizing the firm, focusing the firm on key activities, and preventing distraction. 164 Because venture capital
firms act as an intermediary between the investors and the inves-

156. See LUUKKONEN, ET. AL, supra note 148, at 3.
157. See Rosenberg, supra note 143, at 367.
158. 2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 42, at 6.
159. Id.
160. LI & ABRAHAMSSON, supra note 132, at 14.
161. Yael V. Hochberg, et. al, Whom You Know Matters: Venture Capital Networks
and Investment Performance, 62 J. FIN. 251, 252 (2007).
162. Id. at 253.
163. See LI & ABRAHAMSSON, supra note 132, at 18-19.
164. See id. at 18. See also Michael Klausner & Kate Litvak, What Economists Have
Taught Us About Venture Capital Contracting 3 (Stan. L. Sch. Program L. & Econ., Working
Paper No. 221, 2001). Value-added services can be as important as financial capital. eBay,
for instance, was a profitable start-up that did not require outside funding. Yet it sought
venture capital, which was provided by Benchmark Partners, in recognition that a venture
capitalist’s connections and expertise would be essential in securing a seasoned CEO and
other executives. RANDALL E. STROSS, eBOYS: THE TRUE STORY OF THE SIX TALL MEN
WHO BACKED EBAY, WEBVAN, AND OTHER BILLION-DOLLAR START-UPS 22 (2002).
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tees, their selection of a fund for investment confirms the investee’s quality internally to the entrepreneur and externally through
reputational validation. 165 Opposed to other financing methods,
venture capital equity investments (by their nature) do not impose
continual costs like debt financing does. 166 Venture capitalists
will also likely hire human resources consultants to recruit along
with optimal staffing for the venture. 167 In addition, venture capitalists can provide management advice to founders who lack
managerial skills. 168
Thanks to these non-monetary benefits, venture-backed
companies have an advantage over their passive-investor and
non-investor counterparts regarding sales growth, employee
growth, professionalization, time to market, technology strategy
selection, likelihood of public offering, risk of underpricing IPOs,
and post-IPO survival. 169

III. ANGELS—THE OTHER PRIVATE EQUITY
INVESTOR
The term angel investors originated from Broadway Theater,
where wealthy patrons would provide initial capital to get a new
production off the ground in exchange for a share of the productions earnings. 170 In 1978, William Wetzel, a professor at the
University of New Hampshire and founder of the Center for Venture Research, studied how entrepreneurs raised seed capital and
adopted the term “angel” to describe the individuals who invested

165. See Darian M. Ibrahim, Financing the Next Silicon Valley, 87 WASH. U. L. REV.
717, 749 (2010) (“[P]rivate VCs serve as reputational intermediaries, meaning that if the signals they send ae not credible, their reputation will suffer.”).
166. Advantages
and
Disadvantages
of
Taking
Venture
Capital,
MYTOPBUSINESSIDEAS, http :// www.mytopbusinessideas.com /advantages- venture- capital / [https://perma.cc/GMJ3-DZKW].
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Venture Capital, KAUFFMAN FOUND. (June 15, 2016), http://www.kauffman.org
/microsites/state-of-the-field/topics/finance/equity/venture-capital [https://perma.cc/X5797S5X].
170. Tom Britton, A Brief History of Angel Investing, SYNDICATE ROOM (Apr. 16,
2015),https: //www.syndicateroom.com /learn /overview /angel-investing [https://perma.cc
/83R5-XA3A].
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in the venture. 171 Angel investors are often retired executives or
entrepreneurs themselves, looking for opportunities to make use
of their experience and networks on a less than full time basis.172
Unlike venture capital funds, angels invest their own money into
the start-up. 173 Often, potential return on the investment is not the
only or even primary reason the angel is making the investment.
Sometimes they invest for more altruistic reasons such as a desire
to give back to the community, spur economic development, or
simply the gratification of using their skills to develop and establish relationships with entrepreneurs. 174
The typical angel investor is looking for many of the same
attributes in a start-up as is a venture capitalist when investing.
However, they are willing to provide funding when the start-up is
in the earliest stage of development and before there is enough of
a reputation for venture funding to become interested. 175 Angel
investors provide value through mentorship and establishing later
rounds of financing. 176 Because angels typically invest in earlier
financing rounds, their financial guidance provides uniquely beneficial value to a young firm. 177 In fact, raising additional capital
is likely a service angels frequently provide. 178 In addition to the
financial benefit, the most effective growth value angels provide

171. See Jonathon Ortmans, The Rise of Angel Investing, KAUFFMAN FOUND. (Mar.
28, 2016) http://www.kauffman.org/blogs/policy-dialogue/2016/march/the-rise-of-angel-investing [https://perma.cc/U88Y-ZE89].
172. See Angel Investor, ENTREPRENEUR, https://www.entrepreneur.com/ encyclopedia /angel-investor [https://perma.cc/E5GV-YHWG].
173. Ortmans, supra note 171.
174. Id.
175. See Jeffrey E. Sohl, The U.S. Angel and Venture Capital Market: Recent Trends
and Developments, 6 J. PRIVATE EQUITY 7, 14 (2003) (“The [capital] gap ranges from
$100,000 at the low end, the point at which the money raised from friends and families and
bootstrapping runs out, to the $2 million range on the high end, the time when the venture
would historically become attractive enough to catch the eye of venture fund investors.”).
176. Jess H. Chua & Zhenyu Wu, Value Added by Angel Investors through Post-Investment Involvement: Exploratory Evidence and Ownership Implications, EUR. FIN. MGMT.
ASS’N 1, 25-26 (OCT. 2009), http:// www.efmaefm.org /0EFMSYMPOSIUM /2010-Canada
/papers/Value%20Added%20by%20Angel%20Investors%20through%20Post-Investment
%20Involvement.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NMG-D6LS].
177. “[B]y investing in ventures at their earlier stage . . . when problems related to
idea maturity, uncertainty, and legitimacy are more acute, angels may be able to add more
value through their business expertise, industry experience, networks, and rapport with the
entrepreneurs.” Id. at 7 (citations omitted).
178. Id. at 3.
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concerns mentorship. 179 Some believe monitoring activities act
to spur firm growth, but studies have displayed that mentorship
activities add more value to the firm’s overall growth. 180
Unlike the venture capitalists that employ comprehensive investment contracts to protect their investments, angel investing
has traditionally been practiced in an informal fashion. 181 Although investing in start-ups is speculative at the earliest stages of
the venture and subject to even greater information asymmetry
and agency costs then the venture capitalists confront, the traditional angel enters into investment contracts that are both less
complex and contain more entrepreneur-friendly terms. 182
One explanation for the use of simple investment contracts
by the traditional angel investor is that their role is relationshipdriven. The source of deal flow generally comes from trusted
business associates which serves as an effective screening process. 183 Since angels actively participate in the development of
the venture, “contractual monitoring rights and control mechanisms used by venture capitalists” are unnecessary. 184 Given the
level of participation in the venture, there is also a need to establish and maintain trust in the working relationship between the
parties. Requiring an entrepreneur to enter into a venture capitallike contract may send a signal of lack of trust in both the venture
and entrepreneur. Such angel-protective contracts risk the perception that the angel lacks confidence in the start-up, and instead
signals desire to limit financial loss, or extract a disproportionate
share of financial gains. 185 Overly detailed contracts may also
suggest to the entrepreneur that the relationship may turn out to
be more “combative than cooperative.” 186
In the mid-1990’s angels began to deviate from this informal
approach to venture investing and began to invest with other accredited investors 187 in informal groups or in syndicates that are
179. Id. at 2.
180. Id.
181. Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior of Angel Investors, 61 VAND.
L. REV. 1405, 1407-08 (2008).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1432.
184. Id. at 1433.
185. Id. at 1442.
186. Ibrahim, supra note 181, at 1441.
187. An angel typically qualifies as an “accredited investor” under the securities laws,
which means it has over $1 million in net worth, or income over $200,000 in each of the last
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formed within an organized angel network. Angel investing has
made a resurgence in recent years as a wider audience has been
introduced to the concept of angel investing through the rise of
accredited online platforms such as AngelList and SeedInvest,
which offer new deal structures and connects entrepreneurs with
angels electronically. 188 Innovations in angel investing are speeding up the deal process by synchronizing investment activities.

two years (or $300,000 with spouse) and reasonably expects to reach the same income level
in the current year. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2017).
188. AngelList and SeedInvest were the first two accredited platforms admitted to the
Angel Capital Association. See SeedInvest and AngelList are First Accredited Platforms
Admitted to Angel Capital Association, SEEDINVEST: ANGEL GROUPS (Sept. 15, 2016),
https://www.seedinvest.com /blog/ angel-groups /seedinvest-angellist-first-accredited-platforms-admitted-angel-capital-association [https://perma.cc/X5GC-K3FS]. Angel List was
founded in 2010 and aims to connect angel investors with tech startups over the internet.
Nate C Hindman, Naval Ravikant, AngelList: A Social Network That Connects Startups with
Investors,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Nov.
20,
2011),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/20/naval-ravikant-angellist-startups-investors_n_966167.html [https:
// perma.cc/N9XV-BCSH]. In addition, to providing a marketplace where start-ups can connect with investors, AngelList also has a job marketplace that links up job seekers with
startups hungry for new talent. Kim-Mai Cutler, AngelList Raised $163M for Startups in
2015, Up 56% Year-Over-Year, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 8, 2016), https://techcrunch.com /2016
/02 /08 /angellist- raised- 163m -for -startups- in- 2015-up-56-year-over-year/.
[https://perma.cc/23BD-6KPB]. In 2015, 548,000 “job matches” were made on the platform.
Id. Professional angel investors, along with any member, who have access to deal flow and
a tremendous amount of experience can choose to lead a syndicate. Syndicates, ANGELLIST:
HELP (Aug. 15, 2016), https://angel.co /help /syndicates [https:// perma.cc/7AV5-A654]. In
exchange, they get access to more investors for the deal and get carry. Id. Carry is a form
of compensation to the head of the investment syndicate. Simply put, it’s a percentage of
the fund’s net profits. Id. The lead investor usually provides about 16% of the overall capital. Salvador Briggman, AngelList vs SeedInvest, CROWDCRUX, http://www.crowdcrux.com/angel-list-vs-seed-invest/. [https://perma.cc/L4GN-JQ46]. The start-up will get
more capital with fewer investor interactions and back and forth communication with the
lead investor. Syndicates, ANGELLIST: HELP (Apr. 12, 2016), https://angel.co/help.
[https://perma.cc/LDV2-SSNE]. Investors pay 0-25% deal carry to the lead of their syndicate and 5% deal carry to AngelList Advisors, along with out-of-pocket costs. Id. There are
no management fees. Investors, ANGELLIST: HELP (Sept. 26, 2016), https://angel.co/help
[https://perma.cc/HCP7-BVVV]. SeedInvest was launched in 2013 with “the mission to
connect startups and investors online.” Briggman, supra. Most start-ups on SeedInvest are
looking to raise between $100,000 – $50,000,000 and are technology or consumer-centric
businesses. SEEDINVEST: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, https://www.seedinvest.com/faqs [https://perma.cc/GC7W-VUMD]. They should have already attracted a lead
investor and set their funding terms. Id. The platform charges a 7.5% placement fee on the
total amount raised, if successful, plus a 5% warrant coverage. Id. Warrant coverage is
basically the option to buy more stock in the start-up at the price that was originally paid.
See Warrant Coverage, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com /terms/w/warrantcoverage.asp [https://perma.cc/XY7Q-V5JZ]. “The placement fee is paid to North Capital or SI
Securities, which are the website’s partner broker-dealers.” Briggman, supra. “[The start-
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Angel investing is more broadly available than venture capital to seed and early stage start-up companies. According to the
University of New Hampshire Center for Venture Research, there
were 304,930 active angel investors in 2015. 189 During this period, angels invested $24.6 billion in 71,110 start-up companies,
73% of which was seed or early financing. 190 Compared to venture capital, angel investments are more widespread regionally;
although California, New York and New England still attract
40.4% of all investments. 191 With the advent of online angel platforms, funding opportunities can be pursued by remotely located
entrepreneurs. However, extending the reach of angel investments through such platforms may come at the expense of the
professional interest and guidance provided by the traditional angel.
While group-angel investors still primarily focus on seed and
early stage start-up financing, pooling investment resources allows them to pursue larger investments at later stages of start-up
development. 192 However, pooling resources and the forming angel groups change the traditional angel investment model. Now
that the angels are investing money with others, there is a need to
employ more formalized screening and contracting mechanisms.
Evidence suggests that “the more sophisticated angel groups” are
moving toward adopting contracting terms like those found in

up] should [also] expect up to $4,000 in due diligence, escrow, marketing and legal expense
reimbursements.” Id.
189. Jeffrey Sohl, The Angel Investor Market in 2015: A Buyers’ Market, UNH CTR.
FOR VENTURE RESEARCH (May 25, 2015), https://paulcollege.unh.edu /sites /paulcollege.unh.edu /files /cvr-reports /Full %20Year %202015 %20 Analysis %20Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MD74-B3C9]. Although the size of angel investment market in the U.S.
cannot be measured precisely (because many investments are made on an individual basis
and therefore are not subject to disclosure rules), estimates indicate that the number of angel
investment deals have far surpassed the number of venture capital investments. Id. (noting
71,110 individual angel deals).
190. Sohl, supra note 189. Angel investments in the seed and start-up stage were 28%;
early stage investing was 45%; expansion financing 25%; and late stage investing 2% in
2015. Id. “Software maintained its top sector position with 18% of total angel investments
in 2015, followed by Healthcare Services/Medical Devices and Equipment (16%), Biotech
(13%), Industrial/Energy (11%), Retail (10.6%), and Media (9%).” Id.
191. 2015 Annual Halo Report, ANGEL RESOURCE INSTITUTE, https:// angelresourceinstitute.org /reports/ halo-report-full-version-ye-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JND49P6].
192. Ibrahim, supra note 181, at 1445.
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venture capital contracts. 193 Transitioning to this new angel investment model may diminish the unique relationship between
the angel and entrepreneur and introduce some of the operational
conflicts of interest found in the venture capital entrepreneur relationship. Essentially, angel investors are turning into venture
capitalists in both form and substance.

IV. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT POLICY INITIATIVES
DESIGNED TO ENHANCE INNOVATION FINANCE
In an effort to expand the availability of start-up capital to
small innovative businesses, federal policy makers have initiated
programs that provide grants and loans and liberalize certain securities regulations, making it easier for entrepreneurs to reach
investors interested in purchasing equity in their start-up or other
privately held small business. The Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR)
programs provide grants to encourage the commercialization of
intellectual property developed through federally sponsored research. 194 The State Small Business Credit Initiative (SSBCI) is
designed to strengthen state programs that support private financing to small businesses. 195 The program allows “states, territories
and eligible municipalities . . . to build upon or create” successful
small business financing programs. 196 Perhaps the program that
has the greatest potential for providing access to a new group of
investors is the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act),
which was enacted to incentivize capital formation in the private
market for small businesses by easing many of the country’s securities regulations. 197
193. Id. at 1447.
194.
About
SBIR,
SMALL
BUSINESS
INNOVATION
RESEARCH,
https://www.sbir.gov/about/about-sbir [https://perma.cc/Y6BL-66YE]; About STTR, SMALL
BUSINESS
INNOVATION
RESEARCH,
https://www.sbir.gov/about/about-sttr
[https://perma.cc/9RJK-98P].
195. See State Small Business Credit Initiative: General Information, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sb-programs/Pages/ssbci-faqs.aspx#gen1 [https://perma.cc/EZ2X-RTV7]; State Small Business
Credit Initiative (SSBCI), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sb-programs/Pages/ssbci.aspx [https://perma.cc/Z84B-YT9].
196. State Small Business Credit Initiative: General Information, supra note 195.
197. Todd Blakeley Skelton, 2013 Jobs Acts Review & Analysis of Emerging Growth
Company IPOs, 15 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 455, 456 (2014).
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A. Small Business Innovation Research and Small
Business Technology Transfer Programs
The SBIR and STTR programs are, together, one of the largest sources of early-stage technology venture financing. 198 Since
1982, the SBIR program has provided small businesses in the
early stages of research and development with federal funding
and support. 199 Modeled after the SBIR program, the STTR program was established ten years later as a sister program that promotes cooperative research and development between small businesses and research institutions.200 The SBIR and STTR
programs encourage US owned-and-operated small businesses to
commercialize the scientific and technological innovations developed from federal research funds. 201 While federal research focuses on discovering and fostering fundamental scientific
knowledge, research and development attempts to translate that
fundamental research into the development of new products and
services. 202 As a result, research and development shall greatly
influence the advancement and development of industry as well
as the national economy. 203 Many small businesses do not have
the necessary capital for conducting research and development
programs and are competitively disadvantaged. 204
The
SBIR/STTR programs address this issue by investing federal
funds in small businesses that would otherwise be unable to conduct research and development; thus, the SBIR/STTR programs
lead to the commercialization of novel technological innovations
and the stimulation of economic activity. 205

198. What are SBIR and STTR Programs, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES:
NAT’L INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, https://sbir.nih.gov/ [https://perma.cc/XKU8-LWYV].
199. Small Business Innovation Development Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-219, 96
Stat. 217, 217-21 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 638 and establishing the SBIR program).
200. See generally Small Business Research and Development Enhancement Act of
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-564, 106 Stat. 4249, 4256-61 (establishing the STTR program).
201. See 15 U.S.C. § 638(a) (2012); see also About SBIR, supra note 194; What are
SBIR and STTR Programs, supra note 198.
202. See What are SBIR and STTR Programs, supra note 198.
203. See § 638(a) (2012).
204. Id.
205. See id.; About SBIR, supra note 194; About STTR, supra note 194.
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Under the SBIR/STTR programs, federal agencies must reserve a portion of their research and development awards for
small business concerns through the SBIR/STTR programs.206
Awards through the SBIR/STTR programs can be in the form of
“any contract, grant, or cooperative agreement entered into between any Federal agency and any small business” for developmental or research work funded at least in part by the federal government. 207
Every federal agency with a research and
development budget of greater than $100 million must participate
in the SBIR program by setting aside a certain percentage of their
research and development budget for small businesses. 208 Prior
to 2012, this percentage was 2.5%; however, it has increased by
0.1% each year since and will continue to increase until reaching
a base requirement of 3.2% in 2017. 209 Additionally, every federal agency with research and development budgets greater than
$1 billion must participate in the STTR program by reserving
0.45% of their budget for small businesses that cooperate with
universities, federally funded research and development centers,
and other non-profit scientific and educational institutions.210
To be eligible for an SBIR/STTR award, a firm or entrepreneur must meet several eligibility criteria. A company must be
for-profit and U.S. owned and operated with fewer than 500 employees. 211 Notably, the average SBIR funding recipient has only

206. Id. at 638(f)(1).
207. Id. at 638(e)(3).
208. 15 U.S.C. § 638(f)(1) (2012). Currently, eleven federal agencies participate in
the SBIR program: Department of Agriculture; Department of Commerce—Both the National Institute of Standards and Technology and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; Department of Defense; Department of Education; Department of Energy; Department of Health and Human Services; Department of Homeland Security; Department of
Transportation; Environmental Protection Agency; National Aeronautics and Space Administration; and National Science Foundation. About SBIR, supra note 194.
209. See § 638(f)(1).
210. Id. at 638(n)(1)(A), (B). Currently, five federal agencies participate in the STTR
program: Department of Defense; Department of Energy; Department of Health and Human
Services; National Aeronautics and Space Administration; and National Science Foundation.
About STTR, supra note 194.
211. The Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology
Transfer (STTR) Program, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. OFFICE OF INV. & INNOVATION,
https://healthsciences.ucsd.edu /vchs /research-services /funding-opportunities /Documents
/SBIR%20Overview%20Slides_25Jan12.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2Q4-E6UJ].
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nine employees. 212 Furthermore, an SBIR/STTR firm is primarily a research and development organization and focuses on research and development and not on purchasing equipment or
commercializing an existing technology. 213 To obtain an STTR
award, there is an additional requirement that the small business
must collaborate with a research institution. 214 The partnering research institution must “be a nonprofit college, university, or research organization, or a federally funded [research and development] center” that is located in the U.S. 215
The SBIR/STTR program offers a milestone-driven funding
process that is divided into three phases. 216 Phase I awards are
granted based on “the scientific and technical merit and feasibility
of ideas that appear to have commercial potential . . . .” 217 Phase
II awards are granted to continue the research and development
commenced in Phase I and are “based on the results achieved in
Phase I and the scientific and technical merit and commercial potential of the project proposed in Phase II.” 218 Phase III’s objective is to pursue commercialization of the results obtained from
Phase I and II. 219 However, Phase III awards are distinct from
Phase I and II in that no further government funding is provided,
rather all commercial applications and development are to be
funded through non-federal capital. 220 Finally, an awardee’s failure to meet the minimum commercialization benchmarks bars
that awardee for qualifying for awards for one year. 221
Obtaining an SBIR award has other ancillary advantages.
An empirical study of the long-run effects of receiving such an
award revealed that compared to similarly situated companies that
did not receive such funds, winning an SBIR award positively influenced an awardee’s growth, particularly in locations in which
212. SBIR-STTR Program Presentation, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. OFFICE OF INV. &
INNOVATION. [PowerPoint presentation].
213. Id.
214. Tina Reynolds, Why Congress Should Quickly Re-Up 2 Small Biz Programs,
LAW360 (Aug. 31, 2016, 11:15 AM), https://www.law360.com/ articles/ 832912/ why- congress- should- quickly-re-up -2-small-biz- programs [https://perma.cc/HSP5-G2D2].
215. Id.
216. About SBIR, supra note 194; About STTR, supra note 194.
217. 15 U.S.C. § 638(e)(4)(A) (2012).
218. Id. at 638(4)(B); About SBIR, supra note 194.
219. § 638(e)(4)(c)(i), (ii).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 638(qq)(1)(B).
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there was access to venture-capital activity. 222 Such data suggests
the presence of a “certification effect,” where awardees can more
easily obtain private capital after receiving an SBIR/STTR
grant. 223 However, SBIR/STIR are highly competitive programs.
Because these grants are viewed as somewhat of an investment
by the federal government, applicants are held to the highest of
standards. The proposal requirements and project-management
criteria are rigorous and often overwhelming to a first-time applicant. 224
While the federal agencies that oversee the SBIR/STIR
awards provide information on how to apply for the grants, they
do not provide technical assistance to the researchers on how to
put a project team together or provide the necessary information
to submit a winning proposal. In addition to having an innovative
idea worthy of funding to achieve commercialization, it is necessary for the applicant to develop business plans, conduct market
and competitive research, and demonstrate both technical and
project management capabilities. In some instances, this will require networking and bringing individuals or companies into the
project management team to compliment the scientific and technical skills of the principal investigators. In essence, there is a
need to develop a capacity much like the venture capital model to
assist in the SBIR/STIR innovation development process.

B. State Small Business Credit Initiative
The 2008 financial crisis and the subsequent recession were
exceptionally hard on small businesses. Between 2008 and 2010,
222. Josh Lerner, The Government as Venture Capitalist: The Long-Run Impact of the
SBIR Program, 72 J. BUS. 285, 301-03 (1999) [hereinafter Long-Run]. Lerner compared the
growth of Phase II awardees with matching firms that did not receive such funding. The
results revealed that the Phase II awardees experienced a mean employment increase of 32.6
employees from 1985 to 1995 as compared to the matching firms’ mean employment increase of 5 employees. Likewise, the Phase II awardees saw a $4 million sales increase compared to only $1.1 million for the matching firms. For the mean SBIR awardee, these statistics represented a 56% increase in employment and a 98% boost in sales. The differences
were determined to be statistically significant by t-tests and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests.
223. Camilla A. Hrdy, Commercialization Awards, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 13, 63 (2015).
Hrdy suggests that Lerner’s finding that SBIR awardees grew significantly faster than
matched companies in areas with substantial venture capital activity is evidence that awardees could more easily acquire private investors due to their receipt of an SBIR award.
224. See Long-Run, supra note 222, at 294-96.
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small business lending fell more than 8% after rising steadily for
several years. 225 “The recession also constrained [the] private equity” markets that supported high growth start-ups. 226 During a
period when small business needed access to capital the most to
help the country recover from the recession, debt and equity financing became scarce. 227 In response, Congress, through the
Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, allocated $1.5 billion as a
“credit support program” to fund small businesses facing barriers
to obtaining necessary financing. 228 The Act created the State
Small Business Credit Initiative (SSBCI) which permitted states
to use federal funding to leverage private lending and equity, allowing states to build upon successful state models for small business development programs. 229 A departure from federal credit
programs with uniform requirements, states were given flexibility
to design programs that address local market conditions. 230 This
has allowed states to build upon existing state programs as well
as develop new state-run initiatives. 231 SSBCI rules only require
that states develop a plan to target underserved communities,
small businesses, and leverage ten dollars of new small business
lending or investing for every one dollar of public funds allocated
during the life of the program. 232
225. EVALUATION OF SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT INITIATIVE, supra note 101, at 9.
Small business loans in this context are considered $1 million dollars or less. Such loans fell
from $712 billion to $652 billion from 2008 to 2010.
226. Id.
227. Id.; see also Karen Gordon Mills & Brayden McCarthy, The State of Small Business Lending: Credit Access During the Recovery and How Technology May Change the
Game, 15 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper 15-004, 2014).
228. GRAVES & KELLOGG, supra note 49. While the SSBCI is one example, the Department of Treasury “manages a large portfolio of programs and fiscal policies intended to
strengthen the U.S. Economy . . . .” CROMWELL & SCHMISSEUR , supra note 49, at 1.
229. CROMWELL & SCHMISSEUR, supra note 49, at 1.
230. See id.
231. INCITE CO-INVESTMENT FUND, supra note 50 (“Since its founding in 2011,
INCITE has used $28.8 million in federal funding under the State Small Business Credit
Initiative . . . .”). But see CROMWELL & SCHMISSEUR, supra note 49, at 1-2 (describing how
30 states participate in SSBCI and that California and Massachusetts do not use SSBCI capital for state venture capital programs).
232. EVALUATION OF SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT INITIATIVE, supra note 101, at 10.
“All states were eligible to participate and 47 states, the District of Columbia, five territories,
and four municipalities or consortia of municipalities ultimately applied. The municipal
consortia came together to create initiatives when three states opted not to participate directly.” Id. at 11. “The consortia from North Dakota include 38 municipalities led by the
City of Mandan and 36 municipalities led by the City of Carrington. In Wyoming, 17 municipalities led by the City of Laramie formed a consortium.” Id. at 11 n.3.
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Participating states administer the SSBCI funds through
three primary management structures: state agencies, 233 quasipublic agencies, 234 or contracted private entities. 235 The organizations that administer the funds within the state work with participating lenders and investors to structure small business financing programs that address the investment gaps in a particular
regional ecosystem. 236 The initiative allowed states to employ alternative program designs and offer different terms and conditions to address different capital gaps and types of customers. Despite these differences, the programs are classified into five
design models or types. 237 Four of the five design models are
lending programs, with community banks, mid-sized banks, and
community development financial institutions accounting for
94% of all program supported loans. 238 From 2011 to 2015, states

233. Id. at 12. “[S]tate agencies most frequently administered programs when expanding on existing credit support programs.” Id. at 13.
234. Id. “[Q]uasi-public agencies [are] legislatively created, independent organizations such as housing or business financing authorities or economic development corporations, [that are] well-situated to operate small business finance programs because they [have]
existing relationships with private lenders and/or investors.” Id. at 13.
235. Id. “[S]tates contracted with a wide array of private entities including non-profit
[Community Development Financial Institutions] CDFIs, for-profit business development
corporations (BDCs), and SBA [Certified Development Companies] CDCs, among others.
[Venture Capital Programs] contracted with private sector venture capital funds and specialized non-profits.” Id. at 13.
236. Id. at 81.
237. EVALUATION OF SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT INITIATIVE, supra note 101, at 10-11.
Capital access programs (CAPs) provide reserve funds to protect lenders from losses. These
programs provide working capital to micro-enterprises (less than 10 employees or $1 million
in sales). Loan guarantee programs (LGPs) provide repayment guarantee for a large portion
of loan in the event of default, once the lender makes a reasonable attempt to liquidate available collateral and collect on personal guarantees. LGPs are used for lines of credit, working
capital, asset purchases, and commercial real estate for established businesses. Collateral
support programs (CSPs) provide cash to lenders to boost the value of available collateral in
the event of default. This program can be used for asset purchases, commercial real estate
purchases, and gap financing for SBA 504 transactions. Loan participation programs (LPPs)
provide subordinated or pari passu debt to encourage senior lenders to increase loan size or
reduce interest rate. Venture capital programs (VCPs) provide risk capital to small businesses with high growth potential. This program is focused on providing capital to seed and
early stage, or growth capital to start-ups or emerging small businesses (businesses with new
products or growing markets).
238. Id. at 13. “Large national banks tended not to participate because of operational
challenges of implementing multiple sets of compliance and reporting requirements, which
varied from state to state.” Id.
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allocated 69% of the SSBCI funds to credit support programs.239
While certain small innovative start-up businesses might qualify
for SSBCI lending programs once they become growth or later
stage enterprises that generate revenue, perhaps a more appropriate source of funding would come through the fifth design model,
venture capital programs.
States that that had less access to venture capital tended to
use SSBCI funds for venture capital programs. 240 Thirty eight
states implemented, modified, or expanded venture capital programs with $448 million or 31% of SSBCI funding from 2011 to
2015. 241 Although venture capital programs varied widely between states, they all tended to address the gaps in their existing
venture capital availability. 242 States also took different approaches to how they managed their venture capital programs,
ranging from making direct investments in businesses to the traditional approach of investing in or through private investment
funds. 243
While stages of small business development are not always
easily defined, “[t]he venture capital industry commonly uses
terms such as ‘seed,’ ‘early,’ ‘growth,’ and ‘latter,’ to describe the
stages of small businesses receiving venture capital investments
. . . .” 244 Many inventors seek small amounts of money at the time
of business formation to demonstrate the potential of the intellectual property or prove technical concepts. 245 Since the risk of failure is high at this pre-seed or proof of concept stage, SSBCI coinvestments of less than $50,000 are important in attracting private capital for such purposes, either through angel investors or
accelerator programs. 246 At these early stages of investment, the
239. Id. at 31. The $766 million in SSBCI funds triggered $5.3 billion in new small
business loans. Id.
240. See id. at 61.
241. Id. at 1, 59. The $488 million in SSBCI funds “leveraged nearly $1.7 billion in
co-investment and more than $3 billion inclusive of private financing . . . .” Id.
242. EVALUATION OF SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT INITIATIVE, supra note 101, at 12.
“Reflecting the variety of equity capital needs, states created programs that targeted pre-seed
and ‘proof of concept’ investments, seed stage and early stage investments, growth stage and
later stage investments, as well as mezzanine and debt investments.” Id.
243. See id. at 12, 65-71 (analyzing the states’ approaches).
244. Id. at 74 (citation omitted).
245. Id.
246. Id. At this stage of development, “business value determination is sometimes
deferred until a future ‘institutional’ investment round through the use of a convertible note
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SSBCI venture capital program would contribute a much higher
ratio of capital than would the private investor. 247
Most state venture capital programs focused investments on
seed and early stage investments. 248 Seed stage businesses typically have the “founding team working to develop product prototypes or business model concepts . . . .” 249 Early stage businesses
are ventures with a proven concept or product ready for market
introduction with a developed management team, but without
positive cash flows from operations. 250 In areas that have significant venture capital presence, investment rounds are typically in
the $1 million to $5 million range. 251 Because the great majority
of investments in early stage businesses were outside these regions, the SSBCI venture capital program investment was less
than $1 million. Angel investors were important co-investors in
these early stage investments, with the SSBCI funds accounting
for a higher percentage of each round, resulting in lower private
capital investments, than in later rounds. 252
Growth stage businesses are those that have received previous rounds of investment and are generating significant revenues
from operations. 253 Additional capital is necessary for business
expansion. 254 While some states used SSBCI financing to invest
in businesses that they had invested in during seed and early stage
financing rounds, private capital is more willing to invest in

structure, in which the loan value can be converted to equity with the same terms as the other
investors.” Id. at 74-75.
247. EVALUATION OF SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT INITIATIVE, supra note 101, at 75.
See also, Gabriel Horowitz, Does VC Mean Venture Capital or Very Concentrated?, FORBES
(Feb. 16, 2017, 5:55 AM), http:// www. forbes.com /sites /washingtonbytes /2017 /02/16
/does -vc -mean -venture -capital -or-very-concentrated/2/#18995bf25e8c[https://perma.cc/
3FZP-ZSYL].
248. EVALUATION OF SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT INITIATIVE, supra note 101, at 76.
About two-thirds of the program-wide transactions supported pre-seed and seed investments.
Id. at 4.
249. Id. at 75.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. “[C]onvertible notes structure is also used in early stage investments, but
transactions were more likely to be structured as priced equity rounds, typically as preferred
stock rather than the common stock held by founders and employees of the small businesses.”
Id. The business is valued based upon the amount of capital invested and related percentage
of ownership purchased by the investors. Id.
253. EVALUATION OF SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT INITIATIVE, supra note 101, at 75.
254. See id.

2017

FOSTERING INNOVATION

591

greater percentages in this phase due to decreased risk of failure. 255 Although growth stage investment rounds of $5 million
or more are common in areas of high venture capital concentration, SSBCI venture capital program investments in this phase
outside such areas were in the million-dollar range. 256
Those states that have SSBCI programs that provide financing to “later stage” businesses did so with both debt and equity.257
These maturing small businesses usually have sufficient cash
flows to service debt, but have other risk factors that disqualify
them from obtaining a traditional bank loan. 258 The additional
financing may be necessary for such reasons as gaining market
share, diversifying product lines or preparing for a liquidity
event. 259 The typical state SSBCI investment in latter stage equity investment or debt/mezzanine investment was greater than
$5 million. 260 States that focused their venture capital programs
on this business phase appeared to place greater emphasis on
near-term job creation than in attracting outside or growing internal private capital investments in seed and early stage small business. 261
Once the states had developed their structure for delivering
the SSBCI programs, funding was allocated to the states by formula and distributed in one-third increments. 262 “As of March
31, 2016, Treasury had disbursed $1.38 billion, or about 95%, of
the $1.45 billion available to states” or “[] $1.5 billion minus
Treasury’s administrative costs[].”263 In most instances, the initial tranche of funding took place in fiscal year 2011. 264 Most
states received their second tranche during fiscal year 2013. 265
255. Id.
256. Id. “The terms of growth stage investments typically provide investors with preferred stock at specified valuations.” Id.
257. Id. at 76.
258. EVALUATION OF SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT INITIATIVE, supra note 101, at 76.
259. Id.
260. Id. State venture capital programs typically structured later stage equity investments as preferred stock at specified valuations. Id. “Debt/mezzanine investments were
typically structured as loans with stock warrants or royalties based on revenues.” Id.
261. Id.
262. SENIOR SPECIALIST IN AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R42581, STATE SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT INITIATIVE: IMPLEMENTATION AND
FUNDING ISSUES Summary (2016) [hereinafter SENIOR SPECIALIST].
263. Id. at 2.
264. Id. at 1.
265. Id. at summary.
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“As of March 31, 2016, 95% of total allocated funding had been
disbursed to the states and all 57 participants had received their
first tranche, 55 had received at least two tranches, and 47 had
received their third and final tranche.” 266
At this point, it is difficult to determine the impact that such
funding has had on enhancing small business financing at the state
and local level. 267 The flexibility that the Treasury gave to the
states to determine the appropriate program design to address local market conditions may not have sufficient programmatic uniformity to make the programs easily accessible to small businesses seeking funding. Unless a small business had been
working with a state program that received SSBCI funding, information about the program and how to access funds are not readily
available or easily accessible. Those states that instituted new
funding programs had the additional burden of creating a program
design and then obtaining the necessary staffing to plan and implement the program. If the initiative is to achieve a level of success, start-ups and small businesses need assistance on how to
gain access to such funding.

C. The Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act
“Securities laws require that all offers and sales of securities
be either registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) under the Securities Act of 1933 or made in reliance
upon an exemption from registration.” 268 The purpose of the Securities Act of 1933 is to ensure that investors in securities receive
complete and accurate information from the issuer prior to investing. 269 “When raising capital through the sale of securities to any
potential investors in the public capital market (a ‘public’ offering), the issuer must generally register the offer and sale of securities with the SEC, a process that is accompanied by extensive
266. Id.
267. SENIOR SPECIALIST, supra note 262, at 2-3.
268. Scott Bauguess, et al., Capital Raising in the U.S.: An Analysis of the Market for
Unregistered Securities Offerings, 2009-2014, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION 3 (Oct. 2015), https://www.sec.gov/files/unregistered-offering10-2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8XEU-BYTN].
269. See Small Business and the SEC, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION,
https://
www.sec.gov
/info
/smallbus
/qasbsec.
htm#fsl
[https://perma.cc/BQ3A-7GDP].
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information production and subsequent reporting.” 270 While
these laws helped reduce fraud at the time, they also had the unintended consequences of restricting small business owners and
entrepreneurs in their efforts to attract potential investors for critical early stage or growth capital. 271
“Alternatively, a company can raise capital by accessing the
private capital markets through an unregistered (‘private’) offering in a transaction exempt from registration.” 272 This alternative
“allows issuers to avoid certain regulatory burdens and the increased oversight that comes with a public offering, with the intended effect of reducing issuance costs and the time required to
raise new capital.” 273 “This particularly benefits smaller firms,
for whom accessing public capital markets may generally be too
costly.” 274 “However, because of these accommodations, private
offering alternatives are generally subject to investor restrictions
and/or offering limits.” 275 “These investor protection provisions
must be met to qualify for an exemption from registration.” 276
In 2012, Congress passed the Jumpstart Our Business
Startups Act (JOBS Act), which amended the Securities Act of
1933 to expand the number of investors that companies can solicit
and also the amount of money that may be raised privately. 277 Title II (Access to Capital for Job Creators) Title III (Crowdfunding), 278 and Title IV (Small Company Capital Formation) focus
on helping start-ups and small businesses obtain the private equity
they need to develop and grow. 279 Crowdfunding allows a company to raise up to $1 million dollars in the private equity market
in a twelve-month period, which may meet the needs of seed and

270. Scott Bauguess, et al., supra note 268.
271. Chance Barnett, The Crowdfunder’s Guide to General Solicitation and Title II of
the JOBS Act, FORBES (Sept. 23, 2013, 10:40 AM), https:// www.forbes.com/ sites/ chancebarnett/ 2013/ 09/ 23 /the-crowdfunders-guide-to-general-solicitation-title-ii-of-the-jobsact/#6256c6666022 [https://perma.cc/2JNR-DNKD].
272. Scott Bauguess, et al., supra note 268.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 101, 126 Stat.
307 (2012).
278. CROWDFUND stands for “Capital Raising Online While Deterring Fraud and
Unethical Non-Disclosure Act . . . .” Id. at §§ 201, 301.
279. See generally id. at §§ 101-08, 201, 301-12.
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early stage companies. 280 Both Title II and IV provide an opportunity for growth or later stage enterprises to access the private
capital market for even greater levels of equity funding. 281
It took more than a year for the SEC to promulgate rules and
implement Title II of the JOBS Act. 282 Prior to this time, it was
illegal to advertise and generally solicit private placement securities offerings. 283 Companies can now undertake wider marketing
efforts to obtain unregistered private equity funding; however,
they must first take steps to verify that the purchasers are accredited investors. 284 Now that the general solicitation ban has been
lifted, start-ups and small businesses can seek an unlimited
amount of capital and leverage the internet for marketing their
fundraising and access investment platforms to attract potential
investors. 285
Title II requires relatively streamlined reporting requirements, filing a Form D with the SEC before solicitation and disclosing details of the general solicitation to them within fifteen
280. Id. at § 302(a)(6)(A).
281. Title III Equity Crowdfunding on SeedInvest, SEEDINVEST, https://www.seedinvest.com/blog/raising-capital/title-iii-equity-crowdfunding [https://perma.cc/8JSH-KZNF].
282. Barnett, supra note 271.
283. Id.
284. § 201. Individuals are accredited investors if their net worth (including spouse
net worth) is more than $1 million notwithstanding the value of their primary residence or
they meet three income requirements: (1) individual income of $200,000 annually for the
two most recent years, (2) annual family income greater than $300,000 for the last two years,
and (3) has a “reasonable expectation” of maintaining those income levels in the present
year. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(2017). The Code of Federal Regulations also has qualifying
levels for banks, savings and loan associations, broker, dealers, insurance companies, investment companies, business development companies, trusts, and other entities. Id. at (a)(1).
An investment company is an issuer of securities whose primary business dealings involve
investing, reinvesting, or trading securities, engages in “the business of issuing face-amount
certificates of the installment type,” or has assets comprised of greater than 40% of its total
assets. Investment Company Act of 1940, PUB. L. 112-90 § 3(a)(1) (2012). A business
development company is defined as a publicly traded business entity who is functionally an
investment company that also “makes available significant managerial assistance” to companies if they comprise 70% of its total assets and makes an election under section 55 of the
Investment Company Act of 1940. Id. at § 2(48)(B). Business development companies came
about in 1980 by amendment to the Investment Company Act. Kevin Mahn, The ABCs of
Business Development Companies, FORBES (Dec. 1, 2014, 10:18 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/advisor/2014/12/01/the-abcs-of-business-development-companies/#7c51fd2369db [https://perma.cc/B6DL-N2BZ].
285. See Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Approves
JOBS Act Requirement to Lift General Solicitation Ban (July 10, 2013) (on file at website),
https://www.sec.gov /News /PressRelease /Detail /PressRelease /1370539707782
[https://perma.cc/3XHQ-P4HA].
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days from such solicitation. 286 Strict verification is required to
confirm that investors are accredited. The penalty for not following the general solicitation requirements with the SEC is being
banned from fundraising for a full year, 287 a penalty that would
prove disastrous to a start-up seeking necessary funding. However, since only about 3% the United States’ 8 million accredited
investors are investing in this space, there is a large opportunity
for growth. 288
Title III amends Section 4(a)(6) of the Securities Act of
1933 289 and allows companies to sell a small amount of stock to
a large number of people via web sites called funding portals.290
Additionally, it exempts securities sold pursuant to Section
4(a)(6) from the registration requirements of Section 12(g) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 291 The SEC adopted final rules
for equity crowdfunding that became effective on May 16,
2016. 292 Unlike Title II, the sale of securities to individuals do
not have to be accredited investors. 293 It allows a company to
raise $1 million in a twelve month period, sets limits on how much
an unaccredited investor can invest, 294 and requires the transaction to be conducted through a broker or “funding portal that complies” with 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1. 295 A “funding portal” is a financial

286. § 201(a)(1); § 230.503(a)(1); see also Small Business and the SEC, supra note
269.
287. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c (a)(39)(B)(II).
288. Mike Norman, Why General Solicitation Matters: The JOBS Act Eliminates the
Ban on Advertising, WEFUNDER (Nov. 27, 2012), https://wefunder.com/post/33-why-general-solicitation-matters [https://perma.cc/6XAH-Q5YB].
289. See § 302(a)(6); § 77(d)(a)(6).
290. Funding Portals: Investor Education, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/industry/funding-portals [https://perma.cc/A5W3-PQGC].
291. §§ 77d(a)(6)(c)-(d), 77d-1(a).
292. Crowdfunding,
SECURITIES
AND
EXCHANGE
COMMISSION,
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2015/33-9974.pdf [https://perma.cc/FGS3-HAWB].
293. § 303(a)(6); Chance Barnett, SEC Approves Title III of JOBS Act, Equity Crowdfunding with Non-Accrediteds, FORBES (Oct. 30, 2015, 2:24 PM) [hereinafter SEC Approves
Title III], https://www.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett/2015/10/30/sec-approves-title-iii-ofjobs-act-equity-crowdfunding-with-non-accredited/#d7fb50f419e7 [https://perma.cc/G5T2RNPM].
294. The language from the JOBS Act lays out several investor income requirements.
See §§ 302(a)(6)(A), (B).
295. Id. at § 302(a)(6)(C).
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intermediary that can sell stock online to non-accredited investors. 296
One of the objectives of the JOBS Act was to encourage
small business and startup funding by easing federal regulations
and allowing average individuals to become investors. 297 However, in order to protect the unsophisticated investor and prevent
fraud, there are still a significant number of regulations and disclosure requirements with which the issuing company and financial intermediary must comply. 298 Any financial intermediary engaging in crowdfunding must register with the SEC and the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). 299 The funding portal may not advertise for securities on its website, pay anyone to solicit investors, manage customer funds or securities, or
offer investment advice or recommendations. 300
The issuing company must register with the SEC and provide comprehensive company information to both the intermediary facilitating the offerings and the potential investors. 301 The
Crowdfunding rules require investors have access to business
plans, financial statements, the price of the security and how it
296. § 78c(a)(80). See Joan Macleod Heminway, The New Intermediary on the Block:
Funding Portals Under the CROWDFUND Act, 13 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L. J. 177, 190-91 (2013)
(citation omitted).
297. Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Adopts Rules to
Permit
Crowdfunding
(Oct.
30,
2015)
(on
file
at
website),
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-249.html [https://perma.cc/LZ3J-9AL5].
298. See generally The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SECURITIES
AND
EXCHANGE
COMMISSION,
https://
www.sec.gov
/about
/laws.shtml
[https://perma.cc/YYQ5-5RJN] (noting several regulations); see also PROTECTING
INVESTORS: A HALF CENTURY OF INVESTMENT COMPANY REGULATION, U.S. SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION xvii (May 1992), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/guidance/icreg50-92.pdf [https://perma.cc/C54G-6RZJ].
299. Updated: Crowdfunding and the JOBS Act: What Investors Should Know,
FINRA, http://www.finra.org/investors/alerts/crowdfunding-and-jobs-act-what-investorsshould-know [https://perma.cc/M9ED-XVZ2].
300. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c (80)(a)(A)-(E); Updated: Crowdfunding and the JOBS Act:
What Investors Should Know, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/ investors/ alerts/ crowdfundingand- jobs- act- what- investors- should- know [https://perma.cc/M9ED-XV2]; Regulation
Crowdfunding: A Small Entity Compliance Guide for Crowdfunding Intermediaries, U.S.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.Zsec.gov /divisions /marketreg
/tmcompliance /cfintermediaryguide.htm#_ftn4 [https://perma.cc/PM44-7ZJF].
301. Sherwood Neiss, It Might Cost You $39k to Crowdfund $100k Under the SEC’s
New Rules, VENTUREBEAT (Jan. 2, 2014, 2:14 PM), https://venturebeat.com/2014/01/02/itmight-cost-you-39k-to-crowdfund-100k-under-the-secs-new-rules/ [https://perma.cc/2ZX845M7] (explaining a recent SEC cost–benefit report that looked at success fees, compliance
costs, and costs of CPA review or audit).
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was determined, and how the proceeds from the sale will be
used. 302 The price of professional services to complete the required documents and assist in compliance, can be costly. The
SEC estimates that raising $100,000 may cost up to $39,810303
and as much as $151,660 for a $1 million dollar raise. 304 If, during the course of advertising, an issuer 305 “makes an[y] untrue
statement of material fact or omits to state a material fact” that
makes any “means or instruments of transportation or communication” misleading, the JOBS Act specifically creates liability for
the investor against the issuer. 306
In June 2015, the SEC issued final rules under Title IV that
amended Regulation A of the Securities Act to apply to public
offerings of securities that do not exceed $50 million dollars in a
one-year period. 307 Commonly referred to as Regulation A+, Title IV allows non-accredited investors to participate in private offerings, subject to certain provisions. 308 The rule establishes two
tiers under Regulation A. 309
Tier 1, which covers exempt public offerings of up to $20
million within a twelve-month period, retains many of the previous requirements of Regulation A. 310 Tier 2 allows exempt public
offerings of up to $50 million within twelve months but requires
302. Id.
303. Id. For raises of less than $100,000 cost estimates range from $12,960 - $17,960.
For raises between $100,000 and $500,000 cost estimates range from $39,810 - $69,810. Id.
304. Id. For raises between $500,000 and $1 million cost estimates range from
$76,660 – $151,660. Id.
305. In this context, issuer includes a director or partner of the issuer, the CEO, CFO,
and “principal accounting officer” or controller of the issuer. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(c)(3) (2012).
306. Id. at 77d-1(c)(2). The communication must also use means of or travel in interstate commerce. Id. Also, it is a defense if the purchaser knew of the “untruth or omission.”
Id.
307. See Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Adopts Rules
to Facilitate Smaller Companies’ Access to Capital, (Mar. 25, 2015) (on file at website),
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-49.html [ https://perma.cc/2VG4-JPQP].
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id. See generally Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions under
the Securities Act, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 7-9,
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2015/33-9741.pdf [https://perma.cc/HN9Q-9JTM] (containing citations to codified sections of Regulation A). Companies utilizing the Regulation
A exemption are still required to file offering statements with the SEC; however, the companies utilizing the exemption are given distinct advantages over companies that must fully
register. Id. The issuer of a Regulation A offering must give buyers documentation with the
issue, similar to the prospectus of a registered offering. Id.
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more robust initial and ongoing reporting. 311 Tier 2 offerings are
intended to preempt state securities laws known as Blue Sky
laws. 312 Tier 1 offerings will continue to be subject to state securities law registration and qualification requirements. 313 However, Tier 1 issuers may be able to benefit from the multistate review protocol for Regulation A filings that was implemented by
the North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc.
(NASAA). 314
The above three titles of the JOBS Act all promise to increase the amount of private equity available to entrepreneurs in
need of capital. While it is impossible to predict how much additional capital will be brought to market through these new funding
mechanisms, it is estimated that $1 billion was invested online
under Title II in 2014 and $2.5 billion in 2015.315 There is also
an estimated 8 million accredited investors in the United States,
and only 3% of them have ever invested in a start-up. 316 There is
approximately $26 trillion in savings and long-term investments

311. SEC Adopts Rules to Facilitate Smaller Companies’ Access to Capital, supra
note 307.
312. Id. Companies rarely used the previous Regulation A exemption for public offerings. The JOBS Act required the Comptroller General of the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to study the effect of state securities laws on Regulation A offerings. In its
report to Congress, the GAO discussed factors that contributed to the limited use of Regulation A, including the small size of the offerings, the significant time and cost of complying
with both federal and state securities laws and the availability of other offering exemptions.
Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions under the Securities Act, supra
note 310, at 31.
313. SEC Adopts Rules to Facilitate Smaller Companies’ Access to Capital, supra
note 307.
314.
See Coordinated Review, NASAA, http://www.nasaa.org/industry-resources/corporation-finance/coordinated-review/ [https://perma.cc/P5FQ-DUFN].
315. Chance Barnett, Trends Show Crowdfunding To Surpass VC in 2016, FORBES
(June 9, 2015, 5:33 PM) [hereinafter Trends Show], http://www.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett/2015/06/09/trends-show-crowdfunding-to-surpass-vc-in-2016/#56dfe399444b
[https://perma.cc/C47B-QEBR]. Since this is “private equity,” accurate statistics are difficult to collect.
316. Chance Barnett, SEC Democratizes Equity Crowdfunding With JOBS Act Title
IV, FORBES (Mar. 26, 2015, 8:41 PM) [hereinafter
SEC Democratizes],
http://www.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett/2015/03/26/infographic-sec-democratizes-equity-crowdfunding-with-jobs-act-title-iv/#1585185f5a71 [https://perma.cc/Z2K9-4J4P].
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in the United States. If only 1% of that amount was shifted to private equity through these exemptions, an additional $260 billion
could be used to support small and start-up businesses. 317
Critics argue that potential investors will be misled by a
company’s prospects and fraud will run rampant. 318 Federal and
state securities regulators agree that investments such as these are
particularly prone to affinity frauds. 319 Crowdfunding could
make it easier for people to solicit money from their own social
networks using online services. However, the SEC rulemaking
process structured the investment limits for non-accredited investors to protect them from losing their life savings. 320 Both FINRA
and the funding portals provide some safe guards to the process,
but ultimately it is the issuing company that is responsible for the
accuracy of the information provided. 321
Investing in start-up companies is also very risky. About
three quarters of venture backed companies don’t return the initial
investment; venture capitalists and angel investors know this and
invest in many companies hoping a few succeed. 322 In addition,
these professional investors also provide strategic and management assistance to such ventures to increase the probability of
success. Even entrepreneurs with promising, commercially viable products or services are simply ill-equipped to pursue such
funding opportunities on their own.

V. FROM FEDERAL POLICY TO EFFECTIVE
PROGRAM DELIVERY
The federal programs described above are designed to help
small businesses and start-ups get the capital necessary to grow
317. See AMY CORTESE, LOCAVESTING: THE REVOLUTION IN LOCAL INVESTING AND
HOW TO PROFIT FROM IT 16 (2011) (citation omitted) (noting that more money needs to go
into local businesses).
318. See Timothy Spangler, Is Crowdfunding Good for Investors?, THE NEW YORKER
(Oct. 30, 2013), https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/is-crowdfunding-good-forinvestors [https://perma.cc/E5GK-ZG5K].
319. Id.
320. See Josh Cline, The Six Things Non-Accredited Investors Need to Know About
Title III of the JOBS Act, HUFFINGTON POST (May 24, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/josh-cline/the-six-things-nonaccredi_b_10104512.html
[https://perma.cc/R5B3-KABB].
321. Id.
322. Spangler, supra note 318.
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and contribute to the economy. These programs have the capability to fill the gaps outside of California, Massachusetts, and
New York that do not have a significant venture or angel capital
presence. 323 This is especially true in areas that have national laboratory and university research presence, but can prove equally
important in underserved urban and rural areas that seek to foster
economic development through entrepreneurship.
However, the realization of this potential is heavily dependent on how well-prepared the entrepreneur is to successfully access those sources of capital and determine which option is best
given the nature of their enterprise, stage of development, and the
founders’ vision for the future. Absent the active guidance historically provided by venture capitalists and angels, the novice
entrepreneur must rely on the local resources available to them to
navigate the various potential funding options. Fledgling entrepreneurs look to Small Business Development Centers
(SBDCs), 324 business incubators, 325 or merely resort to the Internet for such information. 326 SBDCs provide the entrepreneur
with fundamental management advice and training necessary to
embark on a venture and incubators provide an environment to
nurture the start-up. 327 While not all business incubators are
alike, most offer the entrepreneur office space, administrative
support, and the ability to work alongside other entrepreneurs

323. Companies in California, New York, and Massachusetts were the beneficiaries
of 78% of all venture capital investments. 2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 42, at 14. Although
more widespread regionally, companies in California, New York and New England attract
41.8% of angel investments. See 2015 Annual Halo Report, supra note 191, at 12-19.
324. Small Business Development Centers were created by the Small Business Development Act of 1980, and provide management and technical support to an estimated 1 million people annually through nearly 1,000 centers nationally. Our History, AMERICA’S
SBDC, http://americassbdc.org/about-us/history/ [https://perma.cc/R27T-87R7].
325. A business incubator is “[a]n organization designed to accelerate the growth and
success of entrepreneurial companies through an array of business support resources and
services that could include physical space, capital, coaching, common services, and networking connections.” Entrepreneur Staff, Business Incubator, ENTREPRENEUR, https://www.entrepreneur.com/encyclopedia/business-incubator [https://perma.cc/H7S9-6QUJ].
326. Darren Dahl, Percolating Profits: A New Generation of “Virtual” Business Incubators is Jump-Starting Start-Ups Nationwide, INC. (Feb. 1, 2005), http://www.inc.com/magazine/20050201/getting-started.html [https://perma.cc/JF62-CFPH] (discussing the use of virtual
business incubators to allow entrepreneurs to garner the advice of the business incubator without
actually being located at the incubator site).
327. About Office of Small Business Development Centers, U.S. Small Bus. Admin.,
https://www.sba.gov/offices/headquarters/osbdc/about-us [https://perma.cc/8TH4-N3AD].
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who are pursuing their own ventures. 328 Many incubators also
offer connections to legal and accounting professionals, as well
as exposure to potential financing opportunities. 329 These organizations are primarily concentrated near universities or in major
metropolitan areas. 330 When associated with universities, business incubators may also provide services related to intellectual
property and assist in transferring knowledge from university researchers to firms that are commercializing intellectual property. 331 Although these support organizations certainly provide
useful information and support services to the entrepreneur, unlike the angel investor or venture capitalist, they do not take a
personal stake in the venture and provide ongoing guidance
throughout the life of the venture.
Business accelerators are the most recent organizational entrant on the scene. 332 Accelerators share many of the same attributes as incubators, but have two major differences. Accelerators
generally make investments in the companies enrolled in their
programs and limit the amount of time that the company stays
with the accelerator to three to four months. 333 The amount of
money invested varies based upon the amount of equity the accelerators receive in return. Estimates range from $15,000 to
$40,000 for between 5-8% of equity in the company, with the median investment of 5% for $20,000. 334 Participation in accelerator
328. David Mielach, Business Incubators & Accelerators: Here’s the Big Difference,
BUS. NEWS DAILY (June 19, 2013, 10:22 AM), http://www.businessnewsdaily.com/
4658- business-incubator-accelerator difference.html [https://perma.cc/4BSC-KP88].
329. Sean M. Hackett and D. M. Dilts, A Systematic Review of Business Incubation
Research, 1 J. TECH. TRANSFER 29, 64 (2004) (citation omitted).
330. See 900 Service Sites to Serve Your Local Business Needs, U.S. SMALL BUS.
ADMIN., https:// www.sba.gov /offices /headquarters /osbdc /resources /11409
[https://perma.cc/Z4CV-AXNR]. The SBDC National Information Clearinghouse serves the
Small Business Development Center Network and America’s small business community.
331. See Frank T. Rothaermel & Marie Thursby, Incubator Firm Failure or Graduation?: The Role of University Linkages, 34 RESEARCH POLICY 1076, 1077-78 (2005).
332. See Kourosh Malek, et al., A Typology of Clean Technology Commercialization
Accelerators, 32 J. ENGINEERING & TECH. MGMT. 26, 27-28, 32 (2014). The first seed accelerator was Y Combinator, which started in Cambridge, Massachusetts in 2005 and was
later moved to Silicon Valley by Paul Graham. Paul Graham, How Y Combinator Started,
Y COMBINATOR (Mar. 15, 2012), http:// old.ycombinator.com /start.html
[https://perma.cc/DW4N-EQ47].
333. Mielach, supra note 328.
334. Paula Andruss, What to Look for in an Accelerator Program, ENTREPRENEUR
(Jan. 30, 2013), https:// www.entrepreneur.com /article /225242 [https://perma.cc/Z357ETR8].
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programs is very competitive. The top tier programs only accept
about 1% of applications. 335 The limited duration of the program
forces the founders to focus exclusively on their business development, sometimes working seven days a week to prepare for
graduation, which is ultimately a pitch day to future investors.336
Although a connection remains between the start-up and the accelerator program through equity ownership, further mentoring
and business development is dependent on the angel investors or
venture capitalist that provide follow on funding.
SBDCs, business incubators, and accelerators are all capable
of delivering information concerning federal policy initiatives designed to improve access to capital for entrepreneurs. However,
they may not be the most effective mechanisms to integrate these
policies into the innovative-finance ecosystem. Not all small
businesses are alike. 337 The vast majority of small businesses are
sole proprietorships that cover a wide range of sectors and do not
have employees. 338 Research suggests that while this small business segment continues to grow and achieve record profits with
advancements in technology, it does not create jobs. 339 The next
largest segment are small retailers that provide goods and services
to consumers and other local businesses. 340 Such businesses generally exist to support a family and employ a significant portion
of the local workforce. 341 The next largest segment are those
businesses that support commercial and government supply
chains. 342 These businesses are typically growth oriented and operate with a higher degree of management sophistication. 343 The
335. Id.
336. Susan Cohen, What Do Accelerators Do? Insights from Incubators and Angels,
8 INNOVATIONS 19, 21 (2013).
337. The Small Business Administration establishes small business size standards on
an industry-by-industry basis, but generally specifies small businesses as having fewer than
five hundred employees for manufacturing businesses and less than $7.5 million in annual
receipts for most non-manufacturing businesses. Summary of Size Standards by Industry Sector, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. (Oct. 1, 2017), https://www.sba.gov/contracting/gettingstarted-contractor/make-sure-you-meet-sba-size-standards/summary-size-standards-industry-sector [https://perma.cc/Z5NL-QHFR].
338. Mills, supra note 118. 23 million firms are sole proprietorships. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id. There are approximately four million small “Main Street” entrepreneurs,
which include such businesses as dry cleaners, restaurants, car repair operations, etc. Id.
341. Id. There are approximately 1 million suppliers to other businesses. Id.
342. Id.
343. Mills, supra note 118.
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smallest segment of this group is fast growing start-ups. 344 These
companies have a disproportionate effect on the economy and are
responsible for as much as 50% of new job creation. 345 Each type
of small business is important to the economy for different reasons, but their need for funding and technical assistance are significantly different.
For those innovation driven start-ups, the future of available
funding has never looked more promising. The SBIR/STIR programs have the potential of providing small businesses attempting
to commercialize federal research and development with the seed
capital necessary to reach the proof of concept stage of development. The SSBCI program provides states with the funding necessary to leverage private investments, and the flexibility to provide access to funding to the full range of small business
segments. The JOBS Act makes it easier for small businesses to
solicit funding from investors across the country, as long as they
comply with the provisions of the Act. However, the question
remains: Is there an effective program-delivery mechanism in
place to provide comprehensive guidance to entrepreneurs on
how to access and coordinate such funding opportunities, based
upon their particular business segment?
Innovation focused small businesses can apply to business
incubators and accelerators for office support, guidance and exposure to funding opportunities, but only for a limited duration.
Incubation is a process, not a place. Venture Capitalists work
with the portfolio companies for as much as ten years or more
before they are monetized. 346 An innovative technology or business idea does not ensure a successful business. Nor are entrepreneurs born with all the requisite skills to be successful. Introducing new funding opportunities to first time entrepreneurs
without ongoing dedicated business guidance and acumen could
be a recipe for disaster.
After evaluating the strengths and limitations of the venture
capital model, and particularly the operational philosophy of

344. Id. There are approximately 200,000 fast growing – innovation driven firms.
345. Emily Fetsch, The Economic Impact of High-Growth Startups, KAUFFMAN
FOUND. (June 7, 2016), http://www.kauffman.org /~ /media /kauffman_org /resources /2016
/entrepreneurship%20policy%20digest/pd_highgrowth060716.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PGQRVV8].
346. 2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 42, at 6.
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Georges Doriot, 347 it appears that a “Venture Development Company” (VDC) may be the next step in the evolution of innovation
finance. VDCs could provide an effective, local mechanism to
work with innovative small businesses to access these new federal
funding opportunities. They have the potential of filling the gaps
that exist nationally in the provision of venture capital financial
resources and guidance. Additionally, they can provide a mechanism to promote regional and economic development, since
start-ups will no longer need to relocate to Silicon Valley or other
areas of venture-capital density to receive funding.
VDCs would be comprised of individuals from various professional backgrounds and experiences—the type of people that
historically became angel investors and formed early venture capital firms. 348 In order to avoid the potential operational conflicts
of interest that exist in the venture capital model, members of
VDCs would not be suppliers of capital, but advisors and managers that would guide the company through the growth process in
exchange for negotiated fees and equity positions in the company.
In contrast to venture capital contracts, which are typically nonnegotiable and drafted to maximize control of the company by the
venture capitalist, VDC agreements can offer more equitable
terms. Because the VDC is not trying to protect the members’
personal financial investment, only the company’s potential investment opportunity, there is no need for such one-sided contract
provisions. Because the VDC will be an equity holder in the business, its interests will be aligned with those of the founders. The
venture development relationship proves to be most successful
when all of the parties’ interests are aligned. 349
VDCs will identify promising start-ups through their participation in incubator and accelerator programs or through other
business networks. Many entrepreneurs adopt an informal board
347. See generally Christina Pazzanese, The Talented Georges Doriot, HARVARD
(Feb. 24, 2015) http://news.harvard.edu/ gazette/ story/2015/02/ the-talentedgeorges-doriot/ [https://perma.cc/CFR8-ATAC]; Tren Griffen, A Dozen Things I’ve Learned
from Georges Doriot (The Founder of the Modern VC Industry), 25IQ (June 4,
2016),https://25iq.com/2016/06/04/a-dozen-things-ive-learned-from-georges-doriot-thefounder-of-the-modern-vc-industry/ [https://perma.cc/2L42-ETF9]; Beattie, supra note 61.
348. VDCs would be formed by former entrepreneurs, executives, accountants, attorneys, and finance professionals that want to keep abreast of current developments in a particular business arena, mentoring another generation of entrepreneurs, and making use of
their experience and networks.
349. 2016 YEARBOOK, supra note 42, at 7-8.
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of advisors during these programs to assist them in their development, so the concept of entering into an agreement with a VDC
for long-term advisory and management assistance will not be a
foreign concept. The support and technical assistance that the
venture has relied upon during these early experiences will be in
even greater demand as the venture progresses. Like the original
venture capital firms, VDCs will provide both strategic and operational guidance. This will prove especially important as funding
opportunities expand through the liberalization of securities laws
through the JOBS Act. 350 Entrepreneurs will need guidance and
operational assistance on funding opportunities to achieve optimal strategic results. 351
For example, many young entrepreneurs are intrigued with
the idea of crowdfunding and feel that it presents the best opportunity for their venture to obtain the necessary funding. 352 However, they may only have a casual understanding of what crowdfunding is, and certainly less of an understanding of the options
available to raise private equity through Titles II, III, and IV of
the JOBS Act. 353 Although the potential exists for this source of

350. Trends Show, supra note 315; Zack Miller, Crowdbuilding: The Real Story Behind Crowdfunding That No One’s Telling, FORBES (Jan. 13, 2014, 7:45 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/zackmiller/2014/01/13/crowdbuilding-the-real-story-behindcrowdfunding-that-no-ones-telling/print/ [https://perma.cc/V8ZL-2WWV].
351. With funding opportunities ranging from SBIR/STIR, SSBCI, JOBS Act, angel
investors and venture capital, entrepreneurs will need to critically evaluate which source of
funding to pursue as it may have consequences on the options available for subsequent
rounds of financing. In addition, accessing these sources of financing in some instances
require extensive preparation of supporting materials to substantiate and justify obtaining
such funding.
352. See Bill Carmody, Top 10 Reasons You MUST Crowdfund in 2017, INC.,
https://www.inc.com/bill-carmody/crowdfunding-the-ultimate-tool-for-entrepreneurs.html
[https://perma.cc/FZ9Y-Q9HU].
353. Prior to the JOBS Act, rewards, donation, and lending based crowdfunding were,
and continue to be, used by some small start-ups to obtain funding for their ventures. Reward-based financing involves offering some tangible benefit or service for a financial contribution. Donation-based crowdfunding entails seeking contributions where nothing of
value is promised in return (typically a charitable contribution). Lending crowdfunding allows entrepreneurs to raise funds in the form of loans that they will pay back to the lenders
over a pre-determined timeline with a set interest rate. See generally Joan MacLeod
Heminway, Securities Crowdfunding and Investor Protection 12 (Legal Stud. Res. Paper
Series, Research Paper No. 292, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2810757
[https://perma.cc/2K4T-4P3S]; Sally Outlaw, Which Type of Crowdfunding Is Best for You?,
ENTREPRENEUR
(Oct.
3,
2013)
https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/228524
[https://perma.cc/KB9A-KZ5C].
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funding to outpace that available through angel and venture capital investing in the future, a clear understanding of the costs, benefits, and responsibilities associated with each funding option is
critical to the sound financial management of a start-up. 354
Although Congress and the SEC have made it easier for
small businesses to access the private equity market for funding,
there still is a significant amount of work involved with conducting a successful fundraising campaign and complying with SEC
rules. The VDC can play an important role in this process. Once
the short and long-term financing needs are determined and a
market analysis is performed, a valuation is established. 355 Valuations are difficult to determine during early stages of venture
development and depend on such factors as the number of potential users, the size of the market they serve, distribution channels,
and reputation. 356 Venture capitalists and angels employ several
different methods to determine valuation. 357 Without existing
revenues however, such methodologies are still based upon assumptions and guesses. Without expert experience and guidance
to temper the entrepreneur’s optimism, the valuations may be
misleading potential investors.
For example, in the event that a novice entrepreneur pursues
funding through Title III (Crowdfunding), the company must reg-

354. Trends Show, supra note 315.
355. A valuation is how much the company is worth. Valuation of the company matters because it represents the portion of the company that the founders need to give away to
investors in exchange for funding. Early stage valuations are an art, rather than a science.
Since the company really is not worth anything until it is profitable, valuation at early stages
is more about the growth potential than the actual present value of the venture. See ASWATH
DAMODARAN, THE DARK SIDE OF VALUATION: VALUING YOUNG, DISTRESSED, AND
COMPLEX BUSINESSES 8, 213 (2d ed., 2010).
356. Anna Vital, How Startup Valuation Works – Infographic, ADIOMA (July 1,
2013), http://fundersandfounders.com/how-startup-valuation-works/[https://perma.cc/2F
G5-B7BF].
357. A few of the most popular methodologies follow. The Venture Capital Method
calculates valuation based on expected rates of return at exit. The Berkus Method attributes
a range of dollar values to the progress startup entrepreneurs have made in their commercialization activities. The Scorecard Valuation Method adjusts the median pre-money valuation
for seed/startup deals in a particular region and in the business vertical of the target based on
seven characteristics of the company. Finally, the Risk Factor Summation Method compares
twelve characteristics of the target company to what might be expected in a fundable
seed/startup company. Stéphane Nasser, Valuation for Startups – 9 Methods Explained,
STARTUPS & VENTURE CAPITAL (June 14, 2016), https:// startupsventurecapital.com/ valuation-for-startups-9-methods-explained-53771c86590e [https://perma.cc/Q5TV-Z2M2].
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ister with the SEC and provide comprehensive company information to both the financial intermediary facilitating the offerings
as well as the potential investors. 358 This information includes
business plans, financial statements, the price of the security, how
it was valued, and how the proceeds from the sale will be used. 359
A VDC can play a critical role in this process by validating the
information provided to investors and evaluating the selection of
the financial intermediary to facilitate the offering. Since the
VDC will have a financial stake in the company through the ownership of shares, they are accountable, along with the founders,
for any untrue statement or omission of material fact that misleads
the investors. The selection of the financial intermediary can be
very complicated and time consuming. Currently there are 34
funding portals registered with the SEC and members of
FINRA, 360 all having slightly different operating philosophies,
services, and fee structures. In addition, there are more than 4,000
broker-dealers, who may choose to establish platforms to take advantage of the market opportunities presented by the JOBS
Act. 361 Both portals and platforms have SEC compliance obligations to ensure the eligibility of investors and issuers. 362 They
also must publish issuer information and disclosures and provide
a way for investors to communicate with issuers. 363 However,
there are a number of important differences. Portals cannot solicit
offers to purchase securities, hold investor money, or provide investment advice. 364
Portals and broker-dealer platforms are under no obligation
to work with a company that is seeking funding. The VDC can
play a vital role in establishing the credibility of the company with
358. Regulation Crowdfunding: A Small Entity Compliance Guide for Crowdfunding
Intermediaries, supra note 300.
359. Id.
360. Funding Portals We Regulate, FINRA (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.finra.org
/about /funding-portals-we-regulate [https://perma.cc/UHN4-CT3K].
361. Jonathon Sandlund, Crowdfunding Platforms and Broker Dealers: An Evolving
Relationship, THE CROWD CAFE (Oct. 23, 2012), http://www.thecrowdcafe.com/ crowdfunding- platforms- and- broker-dealers/ [https://perma.cc/8HNZ-ZZGV].
362. David M. Freedman, Distinguishing Crowdfunding Portals and Broker-Dealer
Platforms Under Title III, FINANCIAL POISE (Apr. 4, 2016), https://www.financialpoise.com/
columns/ crowdfunding-for-investors/ distinguishing-crowdfunding-portals-and-brokerdealer-platforms-under-title-iii/ [https://perma.cc/4WQC-2NDJ].
363. Id.
364. Id.
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these intermediaries. As VDCs work with start-ups, they will establish reputations in the marketplace. Those that work well with
the financial intermediaries will be sought after, along with the
small businesses with which they are associated. 365 The VDC can
also serve to add an element of integrity in this nascent on-line
marketplace for private equity. Much like the premier venture
capitalists, investors will gravitate towards those with the best
reputations and records of accomplishment.

VI. CONCLUSION
Throughout history, private equity has played an important
role in assisting entrepreneurs in transforming innovations into
commercially viable products for the consuming public. This innovation has been the most important component of long-term
economic growth in the United States. However, funding alone
does not transform an idea into a vibrant successful business.
Strategic guidance and management support from those providing
the private equity is perhaps even more important.
Much of the success that Georges Doriot achieved as the father of venture capital was due to his hard work and the personal
interest he took in his companies. 366 Toward the end of his career,
however, he lamented the fact that venture capital was turning
into a method of speculation, focusing on a quick profit. 367 VDCs
will be a vehicle for investor/mentors to work with entrepreneurs
in the way Doriot did.
Similarly, the federal policy initiatives discussed in this article can make more money available to more investors in more
parts of the country. For them to do this effectively, however,
there must be a cadre of dedicated experienced investors willing
to contribute not only their money, but also their time, effort, and
expertise. Such investors are now in short supply. The Venture
Development Company can be a vehicle to bring these investors
into the system and to put their talents to the best use.

365. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, there could also be a certification
process that Venture Development Companies could undertake to be accredited.
366. Scott Kirsner, Venture Capital’s Grandfather, BOSTON.COM (Apr. 6, 2008),
http://archive.boston.com/business/articles/2008/04/06/venture_capitals_grandfather/
[https://perma.cc/4WQC-2NDJ].
367. See Beattie, supra note 61.

